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PROPERTY, PERSONS, AND 
INSTITUTIONALIZED POLICE 
INTERDICTION IN BYRD V. UNITED STATES 
Eric J. Miller*
During a fairly routine traffic stop of a motorist driving a 
rental car, two State Troopers in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 
discovered that the driver, Terrence Byrd, was not the listed 
renter. The Court ruled that Byrd nonetheless retained a Fourth 
Amendment right to object to the search. The Court did not 
address, however, why the Troopers stopped Byrd in the first 
place. A close examination of the case filings reveal suggests that 
Byrd was stopped on the basis of his race. The racial feature of 
the stop is obscured by the Court’s current property-based 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment’s right to privacy.  
Although the property-based approach is supposed to be 
an improvement upon the privacy approach, it merely repeats the 
problems of incoherence or judicial fiat that undermine the 
privacy regime it is supposed to replace. The Court’s new 
property analysis turns upon traditional property notions of 
possession, control, and the right to exclude. However, property 
concepts are not neutral in the manner that the Court envisages. 
For example, it is not clear that property, rather than tort or 
agency or even criminal law, is uniquely applicable to determine 
the outcome of any given dispute, so that where there are 
multiple eligible options, then the judge can pick the one that best 
suits her own preference. Furthermore, even within property 
law, there are different ways in which property concepts may be 
used to interpret the Fourth Amendment right to privacy, and so 
the Justices can and do select among a palate of conflicting 
 
 * Professor and Leo J. O’Brien Fellow, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. My thanks to 
Kaaryn Gustafson for comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 
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property options. 
We can contrast the property-based approach with Chief 
Justice Roberts’s anti-arbitrariness approach to the Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence in two recent Big Data cases, Riley v. 
California and Carpenter v. United States. In these cases, the 
Chief Justice repeatedly insists, firstly, that the Fourth 
Amendment was adopted in response to an institutionalized, 
state policy targeting the public for mass searches of their homes 
and persons; and secondly, that technology has transformed 
personhood in ways that make persons more dependent and 
insecure. This transformation has made us, not independent, but 
increasingly dependent and vulnerable, so that we are liable to 
government searches that go beyond physical limits that would 
otherwise constrain the scope of the search.  
The Chief Justice’s anti-arbitrariness jurisprudence 
rejecting unwarranted mass searches of vulnerable persons 
applies more generally, outside the realm of big data, to other 
ways in which persons are vulnerable and dependent. For 
example, his approach also applies to the type of 
institutionalized drug interdiction of automobiles discernible in 
the Byrd case, which raises the specter of mass policing of racial 
minorities. This mass policing of people of color renders the 
personhood of minority car divers dependent and vulnerable in 
similar ways to mobile phone users. Accordingly, a better option 
would be to develop Chief Justice Roberts’s personhood analysis 
to take into account ways in which racially targeted mass 
policing transform personhood in ways that make them 
dependent and insecure.  
(6) 52.2_MILLER (DO NOT DELETE) 12/3/2019  1:37 PM 
2018] PROPERTY, PERSONS, AND POLICE INTERDICTION 109 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION ......................................................................... 110 
II.  TARGETING, STOPPING, AND SEARCHING TERRENCE BYRD ....... 119 
III.  PROPERTY: CONTROL AND EXCLUSION ................................... 125 
A.  Property Dominant and Property Eligible 
Interpretations of Privacy............................................. 127 
B.  Property Concepts as Neutral Principles ....................... 133 
C.  The Plurality of Property Concepts ............................... 140 
IV.  THE POLICE AS PUBLIC INSTITUTION ...................................... 144 
A.  The Police Role ............................................................ 150 
B.  Externalizing the Costs of Policing ............................... 153 
C.  Harassment ................................................................... 160 
V.  AUTHORITARIAN SEARCHES .................................................... 163 
A.  Chief Justice Roberts and the Jurisprudence of 
Personal Security ......................................................... 166 
B.  Justice Sotomayor: Race-Based Vulnerability ............... 170 
VI.  CONCLUSION ......................................................................... 172 
  
(6) 52.2_MILLER (DO NOT DELETE) 12/3/2019  1:37 PM 
110 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:107 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court’s recent emphasis on property 
rights as defining the limits of state power1 and of the individual’s 
right to exclude the state2 sublimates some of criminal procedure’s 
core questions: the nature and function of the police; their authority, 
as public officials, to act on behalf of the state; and the relationship 
between the public police and the individuals that they police. Those 
core questions have intermittently preoccupied the Court,3 and have 
received renewed interest in the context of mass data collection.4 
However, when Fourth Amendment rights are stated in terms of 
easements, bailments, and other property concepts, the primary issue 
becomes the nature of the suspect’s ties to property, not the powers of 
the police. Instead of directing us to interrogate the relationship 
between civilian and state,5 they look to the relationship between 
possessor and possession.6 Property rights do not tell us much about 
the conceptual and normative problems surrounding the police and 
policing. A focus on property interests reveals nothing about what sort 
of institution the police are nor the police’s proper function in a 
modern, democratic society. 
The Court has begun to directly address the role and functions of 
the police in the context of government collection of large amounts of 
data through electronic monitoring of the public.7 The contemporary 
discussion of electronic monitoring has echoes of Justice Harlan’s 
earlier normative concerns about the scope of government 
investigation, articulated in a line of cases from Katz v. United States,8 
through Alderman v. United States,9 to United States v. White.10 When 
electronic monitoring renders collection of evidence easy and 
pervasive, the Court is more likely to express the directly normative 
worry that the balance of power between state and civilian has tipped 
 
 1. See, e.g., Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518 (2018); Carpenter v. United States, 138 
S. Ct. 2206 (2018); Fernandez v. California, 571 U.S. 292, 308 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring); 
Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
 2. Byrd, 138 S. Ct. at 1527–28. 
 3. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 785 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 4. See, e.g., Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2206; Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014). 
 5. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217–18; White, 401 U.S. at 781, 785 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 6. Byrd, 138 S. Ct. at 1527–30; Jardines, 569 U.S. at 5–7. 
 7. See Carpenter v. U.S. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
 8. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 9. 394 U.S. 165 (1969). 
 10. 401 U.S. 745, 785 (1971). 
(6) 52.2_MILLER (DO NOT DELETE) 12/3/2019  1:37 PM 
2018] PROPERTY, PERSONS, AND POLICE INTERDICTION 111 
too far in favor of the state, so that the state impermissibly dominates 
the public. More recently, Chief Justice Roberts has become 
persuaded that the state may dominate the public in just this way when 
the police have comprehensive access to mobile phone data. The 
normative and conceptual approach to policing, developed by the 
Chief Justice in the context of mass data,11 is transferable to the mass 
interdiction context of Byrd v. United States.12 
The turn to property law as a means of avoiding hard, normative 
questions about the nature and function of the police and policing 
matches an earlier turn away from property law (and towards privacy 
concepts) to address the same hard normative questions. When 
working out the implications of its “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” doctrine,13 the Court ducked out of addressing what might 
count as “tolerable technique[s] of law enforcement, given the values 
and goals of our political system.”14 Instead, the Court preferred the 
easier empirical analyses of whether the public regularly do, or on 
occasion can (or could), discover some putatively hidden evidence.15 
The empirical privacy discussion assessed societal attitudes 
towards privacy by considering the search’s location, intrusiveness, 
and object.16 In fact, the intrusiveness question and the location 
 
 11. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014). 
 12. 138 S. Ct. 1518 (2018). 
 13. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 14. White, 401 U.S. at 785 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan firmly embraced the 
normative approach in White, at least in the context of electronic surveillance. In rejecting the 
property-based approach, he suggested that,  
[w]hile these [privacy-based] formulations represent an advance over the 
unsophisticated trespass analysis of the common law, they too have their 
limitations and can, ultimately, lead to the substitution of words for analysis. 
The analysis must, in my view, transcend the search for subjective 
expectations or legal attribution of assumptions of risk. Our expectations, and 
the risks we assume, are in large part reflections of laws that translate into 
rules the customs and values of the past and present.  
Id. at 786. 
 15. See, e.g., Carpenter v. U.S. 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2265 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“[W]e 
still don’t even know what its ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test is. Is it supposed to pose an 
empirical question (what privacy expectations do people actually have) or a normative one (what 
expectations should they have)?”); see also Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451 (1989) (opining 
that so long as “any member of the public” could legitimately occupy the airspace, then the police 
could too); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213–15 (1987) (discussing the “routine” nature of 
the use of commercial airspace over the defendant’s backyard). 
 16. See, e.g., Richard G. Wilkins, Defining the “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy”: An 
Emerging Tripartite Analysis, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1077, 1100–07 (1987). 
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question were often linked: location17 is usually a shorthand for one 
aspect of intrusiveness. Location substitutes for intimacy: the home is 
particularly intimate;18 other places less so.19 A guiding assumption of 
the empirical approach to privacy is that we work harder to protect our 
intimate spaces, and so express how intimate a space or object is by 
how much effort we require the police to undertake to intrude.20 The 
Court’s more recent property doctrine transforms this argument from 
intimacy or the effort of intrusion into something different: an 
argument about control. 
The Court’s property turn appears motivated by the final collapse 
of privacy’s empiricist approach. Descriptive accounts assessing the 
general public’s capacity to observe each other no longer tracks (if it 
ever did) public sentiment about appropriate government conduct. 
Earlier generations of police and public had to expend a great deal of 
effort to fly over neighbors’ houses and observe their backyards;21 or 
bug their houses and listen to their conversations;22 or track their 
movements around the neighborhood over a period of time.23 In those 
less technologically sophisticated times, it was easier to exclude both 
prying neighbors and the police. The amount of energy expended upon 
surveillance may have loosely tracked civilians’ expectations about 
their susceptibility to state interference. 
Furthermore, the actual capacity of the public to observe others, 
in times past, stood as a rough proxy for the difficult normative 
discussion about the authority relationship between state and civilian. 
The balance of power between state and civilian could be represented 
in broadly empirical terms. From an institutional perspective, the 
Court could assess whether the steps taken by the state to obtain 
evidence were ordinary or extraordinary. From a broadly 
individualistic or atomistic perspective, the Court could look to the 
 
 17. Id. at 1102–03 (Location is usually framed in the Fourth Amendment context in terms of 
home, business, curtilage, or open field.). 
 18. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001). 
 19. Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1672 (2018). 
 20. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393 (2014) (“Before cell phones, a search of a person 
was limited by physical realities and tended as a general matter to constitute only a narrow intrusion 
on privacy.”). 
 21. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209 
(1986). 
 22. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 746–47 (1971); Silverman v. United States, 365 
U.S. 505, 509–10 (1961). 
 23. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 708–10 (1984); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 
276, 278–79 (1983). 
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effort expended by the suspect to exclude the state. In each case, the 
empirical approach tracked a more-or-less buried normative agenda: 
one (the institutional approach) more egalitarian; one more 
individualistic.24 
Now drones, cameras, mobile technology, and apps have made 
these surveillance activities easy and commonplace for the public.25 
No longer can the effort expended to access intrusive or sophisticated 
technology substitute as a proxy for overly invasive government 
interference. If access is easy, and everyone possesses high-tech 
surveillance technology, then all of us are vulnerable to highly 
intrusive surveillance. In the context of electronic surveillance, the 
pressing questions are explicitly normative ones: whether the 
government ought to take advantage of this capacity and whether 
democracy can withstand the government’s doing so.26 These 
questions, however, apply not only to high-tech forms of surveillance 
and investigation, but to similarly all-encompassing, aggregative, low-
tech forms of mass surveillance as well. 
The Court has failed to recognize that the collapse of the 
empirical approach applies to the mass policing of persons as much as 
of data. Drug interdiction is an institutionalized, aggregative, high-
volume business that is triggered by police hunches, and seeks to 
operate, for the most part, outside the Fourth Amendment.27 
 
 24. We can see these agendas overlap in Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (defining 
a search by measuring the level of intrusiveness of a thermal imaging device used to surveil a 
home). 
 25. See, e.g., ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING: 
SURVEILLANCE, RACE, AND THE FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 98 (2017) (discussing new 
surveillance technologies and the pervasiveness of surveillance); DAVID GRAY, THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT IN AN AGE OF SURVEILLANCE 31–32 (2017). 
 26. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018) (addressing whether the 
Government conducts a search when it accesses historical cell phone records that provide a 
comprehensive overview of a user’s past movements); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 785 
(1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (questioning the Majority’s distinction between a party revealing to 
a third-party what someone said to him or recording that conversation and later divulging the 
recording to the third-party, versus contemporaneously transmitting the conversation to a third-
party). 
 27. CHARLES R. EPP ET AL., PULLED OVER: HOW POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE AND 
CITIZENSHIP 37 (2014) (“[R]easonable suspicion of criminal activity, in a legal sense, is not the 
basis for an investigatory stop. Officers are to pursue stops and searches on the basis of little more 
than unsatisfied curiosity. . . . [T]he key decision facing the officer is how far to push the 
investigation, and it is to be made by observing the vehicle and its contents and by asking questions 
of the driver. When the officer’s initial suspicion or curiosity is resolved through these inquiries, 
the driver is quickly let go. But when the officer’s initial curiosity grows during the course of the 
inquiries, he or she is to push the investigation through to a search of the vehicle.”). 
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Considered individually, each encounter, stop, and ensuing search 
may appear to require high effort from the police. Considered en 
masse, however, these encounters reflect deliberate policy choices by 
the police to target specific groups for police intervention. 
The Court has recently confronted normative questions about the 
proper function of the police in the context of police access to tools 
permitting massive data storage28 and mass surveillance29 using 
portable, personal devices. These big data cases have made 
perspicuous, once again, the stakes of policing for a system of 
democratic governance. But these stakes are not limited to the 
technological sphere: they bubble under every decision about whether 
and where to deploy the police. In a separate line of cases, Justice 
Sotomayor has considered, while dissenting, what the burdens of 
policing are, who shoulders those burdens, and whether they are worth 
bearing.30 In different ways, but certainly in the context of data 
privacy, the Court has begun to reconsider the balance of power 
between police and public.31 
Whatever the interpretative approach selected, the Fourth 
Amendment invites and demands a normative approach to policing 
(and the institution responsible for it). Historically, the Court has 
attempted to avoid an expressly normative approach, whilst at the 
same time making intensely normative decisions. Property initially 
filled that subversive normative function. For example, in Olmstead v. 
United States,32 the Court adopted an interpretation of “property” 
under the Fourth Amendment’s protection of “houses, papers, and 
effects” that applied only to “tangible” and not to intangible 
property.33 That interpretation—that the limits of property law 
extended only so far as tangible objects—is normative. It tells us what 
sorts of spaces or objects we ought to protect, using the Fourth 
Amendment, from state interference whilst hiding that protection in a 
series of statements about the tangible nature of property (statements 
 
 28. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014). 
 29. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (discussing surveillance through 
historical cell phone records); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (discussing law 
enforcement’s use of GPS tracking on a vehicle for 28 days). 
 30. See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2064–71 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Heien v. 
North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 542–47 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 31. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018); Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013); 
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
 32. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
 33. Id. at 466. 
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that ignore that property rights may apply to intangible phenomena, 
such as intellectual property). 
Privacy was also domesticated to serve as a non-normative 
category. The “reasonable” expectation of privacy necessary for 
Fourth Amendment protection initially was coined with a normative 
valence in mind.34 The question was one of what relationship between 
the government and the individual ought to be recognized as 
reasonable.35 However, the Court suppressed the normative 
interpretation, which appeared to require judicial judgment calls about 
appropriate state-individual relations, in favor of an empirical one, 
asking the courts instead to intuit what expectations about their 
privacy the public does, in fact, entertain.36 It is this empirical inquiry 
that includes the normative judgment that the difficulty of obtaining 
intrusive technology matches the intimacy of the information sought. 
Spearheaded by Justice Scalia,37 four Justices—Kennedy, 
Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch38—responded to the renewed normative 
pressure placed on the Fourth Amendment by big data cases, by 
translating intimacy-based worries about interference with a person’s 
justified expectations of privacy into control-style worries about state 
interference with a person’s (customary understandings of) property.39 
Turning to property law or property analogies has some purported 
advantages absent from the directly conceptual and normative 
questions presented by the nature of the police role. First, the Court 
can turn to extant legal concepts to flesh out the nature and scope of 
the individual’s rights. These off-the-peg legal concepts may be 
sufficiently clear and easily applicable to novel circumstances without 
 
 34. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 785 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Alderman 
v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 191 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 362 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 35. White, 401 U.S. at 778–95 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Alderman, 394 U.S. at 194 (Harlan, J., 
concurring). 
 36. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2261–63 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); White, 401 U.S. at 785 (Harlan, 
J., dissenting). 
 37. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) 
(discussing the right to exclude the police from conducting a warrantless search due to rights under 
property law and the Fourth Amendment); see Fernandez v. California, 571 U.S. 292, 308 (2014) 
(Scalia, J., concurring). 
 38. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2206 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (Alito, 
J., dissenting) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518 (2018); Jardines, 
569 U.S. at 16 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 39. Compare United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (defining a search using traditional 
property law), with Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013) (defining a search using a customary 
property law analysis). 
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having to invent new legal concepts or doctrines. Second, the Court 
can use extant property law as a “neutral principle”40 for deciding 
cases. The law of property is a system of pre-existing values, 
independent of the will of the judge.41 Turning to property concepts 
enables the Justices to avoid picking and choosing among their 
personal preferences, so they may instead defer to a legally 
authoritative source of decision. Third, property concepts have textual 
and historical roots that can function in arguments about the correct 
(original) interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. Even if property 
rights do not provide all the answers, they have the advantage of 
framing the Fourth Amendment questions in ways that direct the 
answers away from the Justices’ gestalt moral preferences, and toward 
a more legally grounded set of responses.42 
But are these questions the right ones? Property’s personalized 
approach43—its focus on a limited realm of private social ordering as 
licensing of state action—obscures the institutionalized nature of the 
public police, and the aggregative scope of certain styles of public 
policing. The property analysis treats the problem as an individualized 
one in which the police are a derivative, almost incidental concern of 
Fourth Amendment doctrine, rather than an institutionalized problem 
of the distribution of state power that puts the role and methods of the 
police front and center in the Fourth Amendment analysis. 
The role of property interpretations in squishing more expressly 
normative approaches to Fourth Amendment interpretation is apparent 
from the Court’s recent jurisprudence. In United States v. Jones,44 the 
property question was whether the police illegally trespassed on an 
individual’s property, rather than the state’s imposition or distribution 
 
 40. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 9–10 (1959). According to Wechsler, neutral principles are “criteria that can be framed and 
tested as an exercise of reason and not merely as an act of willfulness or will.” Id. at 11; see also 
Jon O. Newman, Between Legal Realism and Neutral Principles: The Legitimacy of Institutional 
Values, 72 CAL. L. REV. 200, 207 (1984) (“The neutral principles that we are enjoined to seek are 
based on values, not the full range of values each individual judge might be tempted to enlist from 
among a personal collection of political, economic, or social preferences, but the values that can 
reasonably be asserted to have legitimacy for the adjudication process.”). Justice Gorsuch makes 
just this point in his Carpenter dissent. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2264 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 41. See Wechsler, supra note 40, at 16. 
 42. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2264 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 43. C. B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES 
TO LOCKE 263–64 (1962) (describing political society as designed to protect the individual’s 
personal property in their physical person and their belongings). 
 44. 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
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of extensive GPS monitoring upon the public.45 In Florida v. 
Jardines,46 the question was whether an individual had extended to the 
police an implied easement to using drug-sniffing dogs, instead of an 
institutional question about the distribution and method of drug 
detection permissibly employed by the police.47 And in Carpenter v. 
United States48 and Byrd v. United States, the property question is 
whether an individual property-owner had created a bailment by 
conveying information or some tangible object to a third party,49 
instead of whether the government’s power to engage in 
comprehensive surveillance is arbitrary and oppressive.50 
In Byrd, Justice Kennedy’s decision to use the concept of 
bailment as a jumping off point into a larger discussion of the 
influence of property concepts on the Fourth Amendment is 
significant. Property operates as a means to avoid considering the 
social and institutional (rather than personal) impact of the Fourth 
Amendment. Justice Kennedy naturalizes and neutralizes property and 
contrasts his control-based analysis to more artificial or political 
interpretations of the Constitution.51 Property is natural, Justice 
Kennedy claims, in part because derived from the text of the 
Constitution.52 And property is neutral because its categories already 
fit within extant legal doctrine, by contrast with the more “empirical” 
or “normative” privacy category.53 Relying on natural, neutral 
principles of constitutional interpretation, Justice Kennedy implies, 
allows him (and the other property-promoting Justices) to steer clear 
of the political thicket of atextual, normative analysis.54 
 
 45. Id. at 418 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 413 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 46. 569 U.S. 1 (2013). 
 47. See id. 
 48. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
 49. Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1528 (2018); see also Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 
2216–17 (declining to extend the third-party doctrine to data tracking a person’s movements 
through their cell phone). 
 50. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct at 2266 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (stating his belief that the majority 
erred in guiding lower courts to “avoid ‘arbitrary power’ and . . . ‘place[ed] obstacles in the way of 
a too permeating surveillance’”). 
 51. See Byrd, 138 S. Ct. 1526–27. 
 52. See id. at 1526 (stating that the Court, based on “the Fourth Amendment and its history,” 
disfavors searches that improperly interfere with property rights). 
 53. See id. at 1528–31 (stating that taking a Fourth Amendment centric approach to the facts, 
as opposed to creating new exceptions, is the best way to rule on this case). 
 54. See id. at 1531. Though new, the fact pattern here continues a well-traveled path in this 
Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
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However, Justice Kennedy’s property analysis in Byrd (and also 
in his Carpenter dissent) is not as natural nor as neutral as he might 
hope. The property analysis does not simply supervene upon the 
constitutional text. The category “property” is nowhere mentioned in 
the text of the amendment:55 the property analysis is a “principled” 
extrapolation from some parts of the text.56 Neither does the text 
determine the interpretive outcome: the correct interpretation of 
Fourth Amendment doctrine does not emerge in any straightforward 
way from property doctrine. 
The privacy approach has run into problems in the digital age. 
However, the Court’s most recent return to the property approach in 
Jones, Jardines, Byrd, and Carpenter, among other cases, fails to 
solve the problems of the privacy approach.57 The Court’s new 
property approach cannot provide a neutral-yet-normative solution to 
the Fourth Amendment’s protection from state interference. As a 
consequence, the options seem to be whether to double down on the 
new property regime, return to the privacy one, or choose some other 
solution. So far, at least, the Court has tentatively gestured at another 
way forward. 
I shall argue that the best option is to take the lesson from 
Carpenter and apply it to Byrd: that is, to recognize that the Court’s 
approach to mass policing of data should also apply to mass policing 
of persons. The Court’s approach is a normative one, articulating the 
relationship between the state and the people, and ensuring that 
relationship is an equal and balanced one. The Court’s big data 
approach is egalitarian: it protects civilians against domination or 
subordination, rather than simply focusing on the individual’s right to 
exclude the government. Whilst such an approach has problems of its 
own, it has the virtue of clearly framing the issue as one of personal 
security, rather than sublimating the Fourth Amendment issues under 
some other legal concept. 
The argument proceeds in the following fashion. In Part II, I 
proceed from the perspective of institutionalized police analysis, 
rather than individualized property analysis. I begin by excavating 
some of the hidden facts of Byrd and the role that institutionalized 
 
 55. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 56. See Ronald DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). 
     57.  Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518 (2018); Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 
2206 (2018); Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
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factors played in the initial decisions to target and interfere with 
Terrence Byrd on Interstate 81 on September 17, 2014.58 In Part III, I 
discuss Justice Kennedy’s property-based approach in Byrd v. United 
States and claim that his analysis fails to provide a neutral basis from 
which to interpret the Fourth Amendment. In Part IV, I argue that the 
property approach fails to distinguish between institutionalized 
programs directed towards mass searches of individuals and more 
limited or episodic non-programmatic searches. In treating 
individualized and mass searches the same, whatever their 
institutionalized status, the Court has effectively deregulated certain 
areas of mass policing. The police are permitted to engage in practices 
that target socially vulnerable individuals with low social capital who 
are unable to muster the political power to prevent or prohibit this type 
of policing. In Part V, I compare the Court’s recent jurisprudence on 
privacy and property, describing searches of data, to its case law 
discussing searches of persons and places. The Court draws different 
lessons about nature and consequences of searches depending upon 
whether the primary target is data, or whether it is persons or tangible 
property. The new challenges of regulating law-enforcement’s 
sweeping power to search and seize electronic data have raised hard 
normative and conceptual questions about the relationship between 
law-enforcement institutions and the public, and even the nature of 
policing and the police. In response, the Court has adopted an 
institutionalized approach to address the problem of mass searches for 
data. When addressing searches of persons or vehicles, even the sort 
of mass search used to search for drugs on the highways, the Court has 
consistently chosen to employ an individualized approach to the police 
and policing. The Court’s novel property jurisprudence simply 
continues this practice for searches of persons and vehicles. I suggest 
that the Court’s institutional approach should apply uniformly to all 
mass searches, whether these be of data or persons and vehicles. 
II.  TARGETING, STOPPING, AND SEARCHING TERRENCE BYRD 
The facts of the case are deceptively simple. On September 17, 
2014,59 State Trooper David Long was stationed in the median of 
 
 58. See, e.g., United States v. Byrd, No. 1:14-CR-321, 2015 WL 5038455, at *1 (M.D. Penn. 
Aug. 26, 2015) (describing events leading to Byrd’s traffic stop). 
 59. Byrd, 138 S. Ct. at 1524. 
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Interstate 81, just outside Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.60 It was rush 
hour,61 just after 6:00 p.m.,62 and the traffic was heavy.63 Trooper 
Long was watching a line of traffic back up: two tractor-trailers were 
driving along the left lane,64 apparently trying to pass other traffic. As 
often happens in this circumstance, a line of cars was stuck behind the 
trucks.65 Trooper Long could not point to anything particularly 
noteworthy about the traffic: for example, none of the cars were 
speeding.66 Nonetheless, Trooper Long’s attention was drawn to the 
third vehicle in the line, a car positioned behind the two trucks.67 All 
Trooper Long noticed was that the driver had his hands at the now 
disfavored, but still legal, “ten (10) and two (2) o’clock hand 
position”68 and was “sitting far back from the steering wheel, and 
driving a rental car.”69 
Based on these observations, Trooper Long targeted the car for 
further surveillance,70 and tailed it for a short while. First one truck 
moved over to the right lane: the other truck, the rental car, and an 
SUV stayed in the left lane.71 While the two cars could have pulled 
over briefly to the right, they chose instead to stay behind the truck 
still in the left lane.72 Once the truck moved over to the right lane, the 
rental car passed the truck and only then pulled into the right lane.73 
Trooper Long then decided to pull the rental car over for a “possible 
 
 60. Id. 
 61. Brief for Appellant at 4, United States v. Byrd, 679 F. App’x 146 (3d Cir. 2017) (No. 16-
1509) [hereinafter “Defendant’s Brief”]. 
 62. Brief for Appellee at 4, United States v. Byrd, 742 F. App’x 587 (3d Cir. 2018) (No. 16 -
1509) [hereinafter “State’s Brief”]. 
 63. Defendant’s Brief, supra note 61, at 4. 
 64. See id. at 5 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 4. 
 67. Id. 
 68. PA. DEP’T OF TRANSP., PENNSYLVANIA DRIVER’S MANUAL 60, 
https://www.dot.state.pa.us/Public/DVSPubsForms/BDL/BDL%20Manuals/Manuals/PA%20Driv
ers%20Manual%20By%20Chapter/English/PUB%2095.pdf. 
 69. United States v. Byrd, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1524 (2018). 
 70. Defendant’s Brief, supra note 61, at 5–7. On the manner in which the police target suspects 
for interdiction, see Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 
1044 (2002); Devon W. Carbado, From Stopping Black People to Killing Black People: The Fourth 
Amendment Pathways to Police Violence, 105 CAL. L. REV. 125, 132–235 (2017); Sherry F. 
Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 
1456, 1525 (1996). 
 71. Defendant’s Brief, supra note 61, at 6. 
 72. Id.  
 73. Id.  
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traffic infraction.”74 Soon after, a second State Trooper, Travis Martin, 
joined Trooper Long at the traffic stop. 
What was Trooper Long’s reason for targeting Terrence Byrd, the 
driver of the rental car? Byrd was not speeding. In fact, he did not 
appear to be doing anything out of the ordinary, and Trooper Long 
appears simply to have decided that Byrd looked suspicious.75 Trooper 
Long’s reason for stopping—rather than for targeting—Byrd was also 
marginal, at best: that Byrd did not move briefly back into the right 
lane before overtaking the second truck.76 There is some dispute about 
how to apply the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code in this sort of situation.77 
Clearly, however, Trooper Long did not have a (traffic-related) reason 
for targeting Byrd in the first place, and had a dubitable, at best, reason 
for seizing him to conduct the traffic enforcement stop.78 Instead, as 
in Utah v. Strieff,79 “[t]his case involved a suspicionless stop, one in 
which the officer initiated this chain of events without justification.”80 
The stop was a lengthy one. It lasted over forty-five minutes.81 
The Supreme Court’s opinion elides many of the details of the stop, 
but the pleadings reveal that the stop was what might be called an 
“investigatory,” rather than a pure “traffic” stop.82 In other words, the 
reason for pulling Byrd over was pretextual and designed to allow the 
police to generate sufficient information to search the car for drugs.83 
 
 74. Byrd, 138 S. Ct. at 1524. 
 75. See, e.g., EPP ET AL., supra note 27, at 53, 59 (“In investigatory stops, officers target people 
who look suspicious”—“when making an investigatory stop, officers justify the stop with a minor, 
low-level violation—or they provide no justification at all.”). 
 76. State’s Brief, supra note 62, at 5–6; Defendant’s Brief, supra note 61, at 6. 
 77. Defendant’s Brief, supra note 61, at 6. 
 78. For example, the Pennsylvania Drivers Manual suggests a passing procedure similar to the 
one Byrd used. See PA. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 68, at 45–47, 55–57. This is a seizure under 
Hodari D. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991). There is absolutely no probable cause for 
the stop. From Trooper Long’s evidence, the decision to target, follow, stop, and seize Terrence 
Byrd’s car was arbitrary, a matter of the law enforcement officer’s “whim.” Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U.S. 643, 660 (1961). Indeed, the Third Circuit acknowledged that the traffic law may not justify 
the search, instead allowing the search as a reasonable, but mistaken, interpretation of the traffic 
law. See United States v. Byrd, 679 F. App’x 146, 149 (3d Cir. 2017) (claiming that a reasonable 
understanding of a traffic violation, not a detailed understanding of the law, suffices for a traffic 
stop). That approach fits with the Court’s decision in Heien. See Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. 
Ct. 530, 531 (2014). 
 79. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016). 
 80. Id. at 2070 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 81. Brief for Petitioner at 10, Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518 (2018) (No. 16-1371) 
[hereinafter “Petitioner’s Brief”]. 
 82. EPP ET AL., supra note 27, at 59. 
 83. Id. 
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The police tactics during an investigatory stop are not random, but 
follow a predetermined script designed to obtain consent to search, or 
generate enough evidence to justify searching.84 Having pretextually 
stopped Byrd, Trooper Long was always going to find some further 
pretext to search the interior of Byrd’s car.85 The only question for 
Trooper Long was: what reasons could he find to justify the further 
search? 
Some of the problems that arose during the traffic stop were of 
Byrd’s own doing. He had an interim driver’s license that lacked a 
photograph to identify him.86 When they ran Byrd’s license through 
their databases, the Troopers discovered that it was also associated 
with another name,87 suggesting to the Troopers that Byrd had used an 
alias in the past.88 They also found out that Byrd had been convicted 
on weapons and drug charges and had violated the terms of his 
probation in New Jersey, and so had an outstanding warrant.89 The 
State of New Jersey, however, declined to authorize the Troopers to 
arrest him for extradition.90 While these facts likely confirmed the 
Troopers in their determination to search the car for drugs, none of 
these facts provided probable cause to suspect Byrd of having 
committed some specific criminal offense in the State of Pennsylvania 
that would justify a search of his vehicle.91 
Almost forty minutes after stopping Byrd, the Troopers had 
amassed insufficient evidence to justify searching his car, and issued 
Byrd with a traffic warning for using the left lane.92 At that point, the 
Troopers had still not started to search Byrd’s car, nor asked him for 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. (“Officers making investigatory stops commonly have decided to carry out a criminal 
investigation before they make the stop; they then identify, or create, a pretext to justify the stop.”). 
 86. Defendant’s Brief, supra note 61, at 7–8. An interim license is a valid identification 
document issued while the full license is in the mail. 
 87. Id. at 9. 
 88. United States v. Byrd, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1525 (2018). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009) (offense of arrest versus offense 
permitting search). 
 92. Defendant’s Brief, supra note 61, at 11. At that point, the justification for the seizure 
evaporated, and Byrd was free to leave. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990). As Epp et 
al. point out, drivers rarely do so, given the nature of police authority. EPP ET AL., supra note 27, 
at 38. 
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consent to search.93 However, Trooper Long had noticed that Byrd 
was not listed on the car’s rental agreement.94 
The events at the rental car office are key to the Court’s legal 
analysis and Byrd’s legal predicament. Earlier that day, Byrd and his 
fiancée,95 Latasha Reed, had gone to the local Budget car rental facility 
in New Jersey, to rent a car.96 There, they did what many couples do: 
only Reed signed the rental agreement, whilst it was Byrd who drove 
the car home.97 There, he loaded the trunk with a laundry bag 
containing body armor and forty-nine bricks of heroin and headed 
south.98 
Under the terms of Reed’s rental agreement with Budget, Reed 
was the only person who fit the rental agreement’s category of 
“authorized driver.”99 Byrd did not fit any of the other authorized 
categories: spouse, co-employee, or additional signatory.100 In block 
capitals on the rental agreement, a separate clause stated that the renter 
would “violat[e]” the agreement if an unauthorized driver were to 
drive the car.101 At the very least, violating the agreement voided 
insurance coverage provided under the rental contract. It is not clear 
that the terms of the contract denied Byrd the right to drive the car.102 
Nonetheless, after a brief discussion with Trooper Long, Trooper 
Martin opined that, under the rental car agreement, Byrd “has no 
expectation of privacy.”103 
Things went downhill fast for Byrd from there. Although the 
traffic stop was presumably over when the officers issued Byrd with a 
 
 93. Defendant’s Brief, supra note 61, at 11. 
 94. United States v. Byrd, 742 Fed. App’x 587, 589 (3d Cir. 2018).  
 95. Adam Liptak, Pulled Over in a Rental Car, With Heroin in the Trunk, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/01/us/politics/rental-car-privacy-supreme-
court.html. Latasha Reed is elsewhere described as his girlfriend; see Defendant’s Brief, supra note 
61, at 4. 
 96. Byrd, 138 S. Ct. at 1524 (The rental office was in Wayne, NJ; Byrd lives in Patterson, 
NJ.). 
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. at 1524–25. 
 99. Id. at 1524. 
 100. Id. 
 101. “PERMITTING AN UNAUTHORIZED DRIVER TO OPERATE THE VEHICLE IS A 
VIOLATION OF THE RENTAL AGREEMENT. THIS MAY RESULT IN ANY AND ALL 
COVERAGE OTHERWISE PROVIDED BY THE RENTAL AGREEMENT BEING VOID . . . .” 
Id. at 1524. 
 102. See id. So, there is a question as to whether the clause goes to possession or insurance 
liability. Why get into questions of property and contract? 
 103. Byrd, 138 S. Ct. at 1525. 
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ticket,104 the Troopers asked Byrd for consent to search the car, which 
he refused.105 The Troopers told Byrd his consent was unnecessary, 
and conducted a search of the passenger compartment, now roughly 
three-quarters of an hour into what was no longer a pretextual traffic 
stop,106 but now expressly a drug interdiction. 
Trooper Martin searched the car’s trunk, based solely on the claim 
that Byrd lacked authority to refuse the search.107 There, Trooper 
Martin found the laundry bag, and inside it, body armor and forty-nine 
bricks of heroin.108 The Troopers arrested Byrd, eventually turning 
him over to the federal authorities for prosecution, who charged him 
with distribution and possession of heroin with the intent to distribute 
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and possession of body armor by 
a prohibited person in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 931(a)(1).109 Having 
failed to persuade the district court and the Third Circuit to suppress 
the evidence turned up by the search, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to resolve the Fourth Amendment rights of unauthorized 
drivers of rental cars.110 The Court eventually held that Byrd had a 
property-style interest in the car, and so had sufficient personal stake 
in the search to satisfy the Fourth Amendment, reversing and 
remanding the case to the Third Circuit, which then upheld its earlier 
decision on different grounds.111 
The Troopers’ ability to search turned upon whether Byrd had a 
Fourth Amendment property or privacy interest in the car. However, 
focusing on Byrd’s property and privacy interest obscures a prior 
 
 104. EPP ET AL., supra note 27. 
 105. Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 81, at 10. During the consent discussion, Byrd admitted he 
had a “blunt” (a marijuana cigarette) in the car. United States v. Byrd, No. 1:14-CR-321, 2015 WL 
5038455, at *2 (M.D. Penn. Aug. 26, 2015). However, instead of consenting to a search of the car, 
Byrd instead offered to get the Troopers the blunt himself. Id. Neither the Court’s opinion, nor the 
Troopers’ decision to search, appears to have turned on the revelation that the car contained a blunt. 
See id. at *3, n.6. 
 106. Byrd, 138 S. Ct. at 1523 (“For this reason, the troopers told Byrd they did not need his 
consent to search the car, including its trunk where he had stored personal effects.”). The search 
was legally over once the Troopers issued Byrd a traffic ticket. See EPP ET AL., supra note 27. 
 107. Byrd, 2015 WL 5038455, at *2. The Troopers asked for permission to search the car, but 
told Byrd that because the car was a rental and Byrd’s name was not on the agreement, they did not 
need his permission to search. See id. 
 108. Byrd, 138 S. Ct. at 1525. 
 109. Id. at 1523; Byrd, 2015 WL 5038455, at *1. 
 110. Byrd, 138 S. Ct. at 1518. 
 111. United States v. Byrd, 742 Fed. App’x 587, 588 (3d Cir. 2018) (“When this case initially 
returned to us on remand, we issued a non-precedential opinion reaffirming the District Court’s 
decision on the basis of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule set forth in Davis v. United 
States, 564 U.S. 229, 232 (2011).”). 
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question: why Trooper Long targeted Byrd in the first place. After all, 
presumably there are many people who drive through Harrisburg, 
Pennsylvania, which is on a major east-west thoroughfare, with their 
hands at the ten-and-two position and their seats eased back. Of the 
three features advanced to justify targeting Byrd, none seems to 
provide a justification, let alone an explanation for targeting Byrd. 
Why bother to target such an unremarkable vehicle and driver for 
further criminal investigation? Trooper Long lacks even an 
inarticulate hunch.112 His thought process appears mysterious, 
perhaps even to himself.113 However, another possibility hidden in the 
briefings is suggestive: Byrd is an African American man.114 Byrd’s 
race, however, receives no consideration as a factor at any stage of the 
case. 
III.  PROPERTY: CONTROL AND EXCLUSION 
Justice Kennedy advanced a number of related arguments in 
Byrd, all of which focused on the defendant’s relationship to the car, 
rather than the police and their program of low-suspicion traffic 
interdiction. For Justice Kennedy, the central legal question in the case 
was whether Byrd had a personal stake in the Troopers’ search of the 
rental car.115 Under current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the 
Fourth Amendment regulates state searches and seizures that interfere 
with a civilian’s property or privacy rights.116 Those property and 
privacy rights are personal to the person searched or seized: a criminal 
defendant cannot assert that they suffered a Fourth Amendment harm 
if only someone else’s property or privacy rights were violated.117 The 
central question in Byrd, then, was whether the defendant had a 
personal property or privacy right in the car, even though he was not 
mentioned on the car rental agreement. 
Justice Kennedy began his opinion for the Court by noting that 
the Fourth Amendment has a central role in protecting individual 
 
 112. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968), for a discussion on hunches. 
 113. See JOSEPH RAZ, ENGAGING REASON: ON THE THEORY OF VALUE AND ACTION 49 (2002) 
(discussing unintelligibility of action when the agent has no reasons for an action). 
 114. Joint Appendix, Defendant’s Exhibit No. 12, 12-A, Screenshots of Terminal Display, Byrd 
v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518 (2017) (No. 16-1371). 
 115. Byrd, 138 S. Ct. at 1527. 
    116.  Id. at 1526. 
 117. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 (1978). 
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liberty.118 “Few protections,” he suggested, “are as essential to 
individual liberty as the right to be free from unreasonable searches 
and seizures.”119 With echoes of James Otis120 and the Anti-Federalist 
Papers,121 Justice Kennedy mentioned the importance of the Fourth 
Amendment for the Founders, who resented the English practice of 
issuing general warrants “that permit ‘police officers unbridled 
discretion to rummage at will among a person’s private effects.’”122 
General warrants, the Revolutionary generation thought, permitted 
mass, arbitrary searches of the population. The Fourth Amendment, 
by contrast, with its demand for probable cause, required the state to 
articulate specific, credible information that they would find some 
particular criminal evidence on the person or in the place they chose 
to search.123 
The liberty argument functions as a set-up for a variety of 
property-based arguments. Justice Kennedy first considered how to 
apply the test that determines whether the Fourth Amendment covers 
Trooper Martin’s search of the trunk. The test is now a multipart one: 
first, we ask whether the defendant has a property interest in the item 
searched; if not, then whether they have a privacy interest.124 The 
 
 118. Byrd, 138 S. Ct. at 1526. 
 119. Id. 
 120. JAMES OTIS, THE COLLECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JAMES OTIS 16 (Richard 
Samuelson ed., 2015). 
 121. THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST (Herbert J. Storing ed., Univ. of Chi. Press 1981). 
 122. Byrd, 138 S. Ct. at 1526 (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 345 (2009)). Compare 
THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 121, with OTIS, supra note 120, at 16. 
 123. The Writ of Assistance or general warrant that so incensed the colonists were transferrable 
written authorizations to search anyone, anywhere, for customs contraband. The possessor of such 
a writ could search on a whim, without having to provide a justification for selecting some 
particular person, place, or time selected. They could target a civilian for any reason or no reason 
or a pretextual reason, see OTIS, supra note 120, at 16 (“[W]hen a late comptroller of this port, by 
virtue of his writ of assistance FORCEABLY enter’d into and rummag’d the house of a magistrate 
of this town; and what render’d the insolence intollerable was, that he did not pretend a suspicion 
of contraband goods as a reason for his conduct.”), and interfere with that person for any reason or 
no reason. Id. at 15–16 (worrying about state officials who “rifle,” “ransack[ ],” or “rummag[e]” 
through people’s houses). Justice Kennedy echoes that worry in citing to Delaware v. Prouse, 440 
U. S. 648, 662 (1979), a case denying the police the right to set up suspicionless traffic checkpoints 
for crime-fighting purposes. Even earlier, the Warren Court had echoed Otis’s defense of liberty 
by declaring that rights to privacy and security were not “revocable at the whim of any police officer 
who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment.” Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U.S. 643, 660 (1961). Otis makes the same point: if searches may be governed by “the jealousies 
and mere imaginations” of government officials, then none of us are secure. OTIS, supra note 120, 
at 16 (emphasis omitted). Instead, the Fourth Amendment required that the state specify the time 
and place of a search—what Otis called “special writs, directed to special officers,” OTIS, supra 
note 120, at 12—under oath asserting what the Constitution now calls probable cause. 
 124. Byrd, 138 S. Ct. at 1526. 
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privacy test is itself split into two parts: did the defendant themselves 
subjectively manifest their privacy interest (by keeping the item 
hidden)? And if so, is their privacy interest one that society would 
respect?125 
In Byrd, the defendant did not properly brief the property issue,126 
so the Court only considered Byrd’s privacy arguments.127 Because 
the body armor and the drugs were in the trunk of the car, locked away 
from prying eyes, the subjective prong of the Katz v. United States 
privacy test is satisfied. The only question was whether the objective 
second prong is too. 
A.  Property Dominant and Property Eligible 
Interpretations of Privacy 
Currently, the Court is in the middle of a major debate about the 
nature of the property interest, and how it interacts with the privacy 
interest.128 In Katz, Justice Harlan’s objective test famously asked 
whether the interest was “one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”129 The Harlan version of the test has a built-in social or 
relational component.130 Justice Kennedy, on the other hand, 
characterized the test as asking what expectations of privacy are 
“legitimate.”131 Rhetorically, a “legitimacy” inquiry allows Justice 
Kennedy to limit the legal issue to those interests that are legally 
recognized, rather than either institutionally recognized (the 
 
 125. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (2006) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 126. Byrd, 138 S. Ct. at 1518. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Compare Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206–07 (2018), with Carpenter, 138 S. 
Ct. at 2223 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment should be limited to its 
property-based origins), Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2235 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that the case 
should turn not on whether a search occurred, but whose property was searched), Carpenter, 138 
S. Ct. at 2246 (Alito, J., dissenting) (decrying the Court for departing from long-standing doctrine 
by allowing a “defendant to object to the search of a third party’s property”), and Carpenter, 138 
S. Ct. at 2261 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (emphasizing the “original understanding” of the Fourth 
Amendment as being rooted in property rights). 
 129. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 130. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 785–86 (1973) (Harlan, J., dissenting) 
(proposing that the question, whether some police activity is “a tolerable technique of law 
enforcement” be “answered by assessing the nature of a particular practice and the likely extent of 
its impact on the individual’s sense of security balanced against the utility  of the conduct as a 
technique of law enforcement”); Alderman v. U.S., 394 U.S. 165, 193 (1969) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment’s privacy protection relates to “persons, not 
places”). 
 131. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2227–28 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 
439 U.S. 128, 143–44, n.12 (1978)). 
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institutional approach) or empirically socially recognized (the 
traditional privacy approach).132 
Property concepts, Justice Kennedy argues, inform what 
expectations of privacy count as “legitimate.”133 But how? What is the 
judge’s duty when property concepts are an available interpretative 
resource? Is the judge under a mandatory duty to apply property 
concepts? Or does the judge have discretion to ignore them? Justice 
Kennedy initially prevaricates, suggesting that property concepts are 
merely “instructive.”134 Instructive concepts are helpful devices that 
judges are free to ignore. However, a few sentences later, Justice 
Kennedy notes that the Court’s earlier reliance on property concepts 
was “supplement[ed], rather than displace[d]” by Justice Harlan’s 
privacy analysis.135 Justice Kennedy’s framing indicates that judges 
must expressly consider, and perhaps even must apply, property 
concepts when they are pertinent. 
Justice Kennedy’s interpretative approach deserves a little 
unpacking here. If the property approach is now mandatory, so that 
judges are required to use property concepts whenever interpreting 
privacy ones, there are still further questions to ask. Is the property 
analysis of privacy inclusive or exclusive? That is, even if the judge is 
under a mandatory duty to use property concepts, must they use 
property concepts to the exclusion of non-property concepts, or are 
property concepts simply one among the range of concepts available 
to interpret Fourth Amendment privacy? 
If Justice Kennedy’s view is an inclusive one, so that property is 
one among other privacy-interpreting concepts, then we have a further 
question: is property the dominant way to interpret privacy, or is the 
view a more egalitarian one? In other words, is property primus inter 
pares—the most important privacy concept—or is it on a par with the 
other eligible interpretative concepts?—as the Court in Oliver v. 
 
 132. See generally Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2261–72 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (discussing the 
theory of reasonable expectation of privacy articulated in Katz). 
 133. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2227 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 
U.S. 128, 143–44 (1978)). 
 134. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2268 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 135. Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1526 (2018) (quoting Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 
1, 11 (2013)). 
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United States136 put it: “but one element in determining whether 
expectations of privacy are legitimate.”137 
Between the Supreme Court’s 1967 opinion in Katz and its 2012 
opinion in United States v. Jones, the Court’s governing approach to 
interpreting privacy concepts (and the Fourth Amendment in general) 
has been to treat privacy concepts as eligible but not dominant 
interpretative aids.138 Even in Jones, Justice Alito’s concurrence 
attempted to retain the non-dominant, one-element approach to 
property concepts.139 Justice Alito quoted Oliver’s “one element” 
language in support of this non-dominant interpretation and 
emphasized that “[t]he premise that property interests control the right 
of the Government to search and seize has been discredited.”140 
Prior to Jones, the Court consistently followed Justice Harlan’s 
Katz concurrence down the one-element-among-others property 
interpretation path. For example, in Rakas v. Illinois,141 the Court 
insisted that “even a property interest . . . may not be sufficient to 
establish a legitimate expectation of privacy.”142 The Rakas Court 
found unpersuasive “arcane distinctions developed in property and tort 
law between guests, licensees, invitees, and the like.”143 The Court 
emphasized that Katz had 
repudiate[ed] the doctrine . . . that if police officers had not 
been guilty of a common-law trespass they were not 
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment from 
eavesdropping . . . [so that now] the capacity to claim the 
 
 136. 466 U.S. 170, 183 (1984). 
 137. Id. at 183. 
 138. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986) (discussing the 
intrusiveness of searches using enhanced surveillance devices on commercial and private property); 
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212 (1986) (discussing the privacy implications of the 
curtilage); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984) (interpreting open fields doctrine 
consistently with right to privacy); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (deciding that 
law of “physical trespass based on the law of real property” was not dispositive for issues of Fourth 
Amendment privacy); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 600 (1981) (holding that commercial 
property subject to federal regulatory scheme has less claim to Fourth Amendment privacy 
protection than private property); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978) (holding that “arcane 
distinctions developed in property and tort law between guests, licensees, invitees, and the like, 
ought not to control” the Fourth Amendment inquiry). 
 139. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 423 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (advocating 
that property rights are only one part of the consideration when determining the existence of a 
privacy interest). 
 140. Id. 
 141. 439 U.S. 128 (1978). 
 142. Id. at 143 n. 12 (citations omitted). 
 143. Id. at 143. 
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protection of the Fourth Amendment depends not upon a 
property right in the invaded place but upon whether the 
person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.144 
In two cases decided on the same day in 1980, Rawlings v. 
Kentucky,145 and United States v. Salvucci,146 the Court “emphatically 
rejected the notion that ‘arcane’ concepts of property law ought to 
control the ability to claim the protections of the Fourth 
Amendment.”147 In support of its eligibility, one-element-among-
others approach, the Court stated that: 
legal possession of a seized good is not a proxy for 
determining whether the owner had a Fourth Amendment 
interest, for it does not invariably represent the protected 
Fourth Amendment interest. This Court has repeatedly 
repudiated the notion that “arcane distinctions developed in 
property and tort law” ought to control our Fourth 
Amendment inquiry . . . ‘it is unnecessary and ill-advised to 
import into the law surrounding the constitutional right to be 
free from unreasonable searches and seizures subtle 
distinctions, developed and refined by the common law in 
evolving the body of private property law . . . .’ While 
property ownership is clearly a factor to be considered in 
determining whether an individual’s Fourth Amendment 
rights have been violated, property rights are neither the 
beginning nor the end of this Court’s inquiry . . . We simply 
decline to use possession of a seized good as a substitute for 
a factual finding that the owner of the good had a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the area searched.148 
Shortly afterwards, in a series of cases discussing the state’s right 
to conduct aerial surveillance of private property, the Court rejected 
the idea that “the interests vindicated by the Fourth Amendment 
were . . . identical with those served by the common law 
 
 144. Id. 
 145. 448 U.S. 98, 105–06 (1980). 
 146. 448 U.S. 83 (1980). 
 147. Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 105–06 (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 149–50, n. 17); see Salvucci, 
448 U.S. at 91 (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143). 
 148. Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 91–92 (citing Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143; Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 
364 (1968); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266 
(1960)). 
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of trespass.”149 In Oliver v. United States, the Court quoted Katz, 
Warden, and Rakas in support of the non-dominant, one-element-in-
the-analysis approach.150 The Oliver Court rejected a turn to the 
common law of property as determinative of privacy interests, opining 
that: 
The common law may guide consideration of what areas are 
protected by the Fourth Amendment by defining areas whose 
invasion by others is wrongful. The law of trespass, however, 
forbids intrusions upon land that the Fourth Amendment 
would not proscribe. For trespass law extends to instances 
where the exercise of the right to exclude vindicates no 
legitimate privacy interest. Thus, in the case of open fields, 
the general rights of property protected by the common law 
of trespass have little or no relevance to the applicability of 
the Fourth Amendment.151 
In a series of cases discussing electronic monitoring of public and 
private spaces, the Court again adopted the property eligible, one-
element approach to interpreting the Fourth Amendment. For 
example, in United States v. Knotts,152 the Court first faced the issue 
of whether placing an electronic tracking device on or in some item of 
movable property constituted a Fourth Amendment seizure. The 
Knotts Court rejected the idea that “notions of physical trespass based 
on the law of real property were . . . dispositive.”153 One year later, 
when the Court in United States v. Karo154 addressed the same issue 
once again, the Court again rejected a trespass approach, describing 
“[t]he existence of a physical trespass [a]s only marginally relevant to 
the question of whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated.”155 
 
 149. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 460 n.3 (1989). Justice Powell glossed the Court’s approach 
in the police overflight cases:  
[T]he Court in Katz abandoned its inquiry into whether police had committed 
a physical trespass. Katz announced a standard under which the occurrence of 
a search turned not on the physical position of the police conducting the 
surveillance, but on whether the surveillance in question had invaded a 
constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.  
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 219 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 150. Id. at 183. 
 151. Id. at 183–84 (citation omitted). 
 152. 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
 153. Id. at 285. 
 154. 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
 155. Id. at 712–13. 
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As the Karo Court went on to explain, however, “an actual trespass is 
neither necessary nor sufficient to establish a constitutional 
violation . . . . [I]f the presence of . . . [an electronic tracking device in 
some piece of property] constituted a seizure merely because of its 
occupation of space, it would follow that the presence of any object, 
regardless of its nature, would violate the Fourth Amendment.”156 The 
Court refused to apply property concepts to a “technical trespass on 
the space occupied.”157 In the last of these pre-Jones electronic 
surveillance cases, Kyllo v. United States,158 Justice Scalia, citing to 
Rakas, acknowledged that the Court had “decoupled violation of a 
person’s Fourth Amendment rights from trespassory violation of his 
property.”159 
Perhaps the most obvious place in which the Court adopted an 
inclusive and egalitarian approach to the interpretative role of property 
concepts was in the determination of joint authority over some thing 
or object.160 Indeed, in Georgia v. Randolph,161 considerations of 
“social custom”162 appear to dominate “private law”163 or property 
concepts when working out the ability of a co-tenant (co-inhabitant, 
or overnight guest)164 to assert their Fourth Amendment rights against 
a police officer wishing to search their premises. 
Justice Kennedy’s brief discussion of interpretative approaches to 
property concepts in Byrd is consistent with the more recent, property-
dominant or property-exclusive, trend. He maintains the dominant 
approach from Byrd to Carpenter, which was decided a few weeks 
after Byrd. In Carpenter, Justice Kennedy repeats his view that 
“property-based concepts that have long grounded the analytic 
framework that pertains in these cases.”165 He continues, however, that 
“‘property concepts’ are, nonetheless, fundamental ‘in determining 
 
 156. Id. at 713. 
 157. Id. at 712. Compare United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–05, 411 n.8 (holding that a 
Fourth Amendment violation occurs for a technical trespass if it concerns “persons, houses, papers, 
and effects”), with Jones, 565 U.S. at 423, 431 (Alito, J., concurring) (rejecting the trespass based 
theory relied on by the majority because a trespass is neither necessary nor sufficient to establish a 
Fourth Amendment violation). 
 158. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 159. Id. at 32. 
 160. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 103 (2006). 
    161.  547 U.S. 103 (2006). 
 162. Id. at 120. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2224 (2018) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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the presence or absence of the privacy interests protected by that 
Amendment.’”166 The interpolation is central to Justice Kennedy’s 
property-dominant interpretative approach. For Rakas emphatically 
does not say that property concepts are fundamental. 
The property-dominant insertion is all Justice Kennedy’s own 
invention. Rakas adopts a property-eligible interpretation of privacy. 
What the Court actually says is: 
These ideas [of a Fourth Amendment controlled by common-
law property interests] were rejected both in Jones . . . and 
Katz . . . But by focusing on legitimate expectations of 
privacy in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has 
not altogether abandoned use of property concepts in 
determining the presence or absence of the privacy interests 
protected by that Amendment.167 
The rewriting of property-eligible interpretations of privacy to 
recharacterize them as property-dominant is a feature of the Court’s 
recent return to property under the Fourth Amendment. 
B.  Property Concepts as Neutral Principles 
Justice Kennedy points, however, to another advantage of 
property concepts for interpreting the Fourth Amendment. He seems 
to view property concepts as providing what Herbert Wechsler called 
“neutral principles” of constitutional interpretation.168 Justice 
Kennedy follows the neutral principles approach when he argues that 
privacy concepts must be fleshed out using conceptions that stand 
outside the Fourth Amendment itself.169 On his non-originalist 
reading, we can add the following minor premise to construct a neat 
syllogism: property concepts stand outside the Fourth Amendment. 
[Justices Thomas and Alito are unlikely to agree.] Therefore, property 
concepts are a permissible basis for interpreting the concept of 
legitimate privacy interests. However, some important difficulties 
 
 166. Id. at 2227 (emphasis added). 
 167. Rakas v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978) (emphasis added). 
 168. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 
15 (1959). 
 169. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2245 (citing Rakas, 439 U.S. at 144 n.12) (“To address this 
circularity problem, the Court has insisted that expectations of privacy must come from outside its 
Fourth Amendment precedents, ‘either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or 
to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.’”).  
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remain in identifying which property comments are likely to be 
“instructive.” 
If we are not to focus on common law or contemporary legal 
understandings of property, then how are we to work out which 
property concepts matter? Justice Kennedy flits around from lawful 
possession (with or without control),170 to exclusive control (with or 
without possession),171 to both possession-and-control,172 to mere-
possession-and-control,173 to lawful-possession-and-control.174 Each 
of these presupposes a different vision of the property relationship. 
And the addition of lawfulness re-introduces legal technicalities into 
what was supposed to be a non-legal concept. Possession, after all, 
need not be identified with (normative, legal) property concepts, but 
rather with (constitutive, lay) physical ones. 
These are all different concepts with different bases in the law of 
property. Actual possession may or may not confer property rights in 
some item of property, depending in part upon whether the property is 
real or personal, who has title to the property, the nature and duration 
of the possession, and so on.175 In terms of rights to real property, it 
may matter that some tenant has actual possession and claims rights 
over the property, as against the title holder, by adverse possession.176 
Actual possession may not be enough if others also have the ability to 
use the property.177 For example, the person in physical control of the 
property may only have custody, and not true possession of the 
property, though their possession appear to be “actual.” The non-
 
 170. Id. at 2270 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (quoting Christensen v. Hoover, 643 P.2d 525, 529 
(Colo. 1982) (en banc)) (“[W]here a person comes into lawful possession of the personal property 
of another, even though there is no formal agreement between the property’s owner and its 
possessor, the possessor will become a constructive bailee when justice so requires.”). 
 171. Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1528 (2018) (“[D]istinction  . . . may be made in 
some circumstances between the Fourth Amendment rights of passengers and the rights of an 
individual who has exclusive control of an automobile or of its locked compartments.”). 
 172. Id. at 1529 (“No matter the degree of possession and control, the car thief [i.e., unlawful 
possessor] would not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a stolen car.”). 
 173. Id. at 1528 (“[T]he sole occupant of a rental car always has an expectation of privacy in it 
based on mere possession and control.”). 
 174. Id. at 1528–29 (“The Court sees no reason why the expectation of privacy that comes from 
lawful possession and control and the attendant right to exclude would differ depending on whether 
the car in question is rented or privately owned by someone other than the person in current 
possession of it . . . that risk allocation has little to do with whether one would have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the rental car if, for example, he or she otherwise has lawful possession 
of and control over the car.”). 
 175. 63C AM. JUR. 2D Property § 34, Westlaw (2009). 
 176. Id. § 36. 
 177. Id. 
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possessor may retain their property interest so long as they have title 
or control over the property.178 That constructive property right may 
exist even if title is jointly shared, and so the possessor lacks exclusive, 
rather than joint, control over the property. Of course, exclusive 
control could mean control in conjunction with the right to exclude, 
which is consistent with joint title to property. Furthermore, both the 
custodian and the person with title may have lawful possession of the 
property, though only the non-possessor has a property right. And the 
issue of who has possession, exclusive control, and the like arise in 
criminal law, for example, in the context of drug possession, where 
there is, in addition to “dominion and control,” the requirement of 
knowledge or intent to possess.179 
Worse, focusing on property considerations sometimes leads the 
Justices into confused legal backwaters. Consider, for example, in 
Carpenter, Justice Kennedy appears to consider that banks’ and phone 
companies’ property interests result from information contained in 
their own business records, rather than their having taken custody of 
the defendant’s own proprietary information.180 In other words, a fair 
reading of Justice Kennedy’s position appears to be that the third-party 
doctrine tracks the Federal Rules of Evidence business records 
exception to the prohibition on hearsay evidence: evidence that is 
regularly gathered as part of the regular activity of the business.181 
Justice Kennedy’s seems an odd understanding of both the law 
and the realities of collecting the sort of data at issue in these earlier 
cases. The third-party doctrine includes the transfer and so “knowing 
exposure” of a much broader range of information than that collected 
as part of a business record. For example, the sort of information 
transferred in United States v. Miller,182 a core third-party doctrine 
case, was financial information prepared by the defendant, and so not 
a business record in the way Justice Kennedy imagines.183 Whilst the 
Federal Rules of Evidence’s business records doctrine might indeed 
identify information that is the property of the business, because it was 
 
 178. Id. § 35. 
 179. 25 AM. JUR. 2D Drugs and Controlled Substances § 162, Westlaw (database updated 
Feb. 2019). 
 180. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2226–27 (2018). 
 181. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6). 
 182. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
 183. Id. at 442. 
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generated by that business, the third-party doctrine includes much 
more than this proprietary sort of information. 
Finally, Justice Kennedy’s property argument, following some 
suggestions in Rakas v. Illinois, fastens onto a worry about unlawful 
possession: whether the vehicle or other object is stolen or not.184 
Under a common law approach, it matters whether Byrd received a 
valid legal permission to lawfully possess the car. If not, the car was 
effectively stolen, given the violation of the rental agreement. In that 
case, possession and control is no longer determinative of Fourth 
Amendment rights. Bailments cannot be created if the property is 
stolen. Having stolen the item, despite his possession and control of 
the item, the thief has no property right, and so, on the property-
dominant interpretation, no Fourth Amendment privacy right either.185 
Lawful possession is thus determinative of the bailment issue: there 
can be no bailment because possession is unauthorized. However, 
Justice Kennedy’s treatment of this issue is cursory, at best.186 Even 
though bailment is a quintessential property concept, no longer 
existing outside the legal context, Justice Kennedy solves the property 
question primarily by invoking an empirical issue—what expectations 
are “customary”—rather than by a property issue—the law of 
bailment.187 
The no-unlawful-property restriction highlights a difference 
between the property approach and the prior privacy one. Privacy, at 
least in this area of Fourth Amendment law, was relational. The 
“control and exclude” question does not turn on who has possession, 
but who has authority, real or apparent.188 The property approach thus 
does not track the more usual apparent authority approach to Fourth 
Amendment rights.189 Under the apparent authority approach, the 
suspect has a Fourth Amendment interest so long as an officer could 
 
 184. Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1529–30 (2018). 
 185. Id. 
 186. See id. at 1526–27. 
 187. See id. at 1527. 
 188. 68 AM. JUR. 2D Searches and Seizures § 156, Westlaw (2009). 
 189. Justice Alito does adopt a property approach in Fernandez v. California, 571 U.S. 292 
(2014), a joint-authority case. See Fernandez, 571 U.S. at 305. But his approach does not turn on 
the niceties of property law, but only on whether a lawful occupant has authority to consent to a 
search despite the conflicting property interests of a co-tenant. See id. (“Suppose that an 
incarcerated objector and a consenting co-occupant were joint tenants on a lease. If the objector, 
after incarceration, stopped paying rent, would he still have ‘common authority,’ and would his 
objection retain its force? Would it be enough that his name remained on the lease? Would the 
result be different if the objecting and consenting lessees had an oral month-to-month tenancy?”). 
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reasonably believe, given the facts as they perceived them, that the 
suspect had authority to exercise control by excluding uninvited 
intruders.190 
Apparent authority exists even if the suspect has no property 
interest in the object or place they claim to control.191 Apparent 
authority emphasizes the circumstances as they present themselves to 
a reasonable officer, including the relationships between the 
individuals claiming an interest in that property.192 Lawful authority 
emphasizes the legal status of the possessor, even if they are not as 
they seem.193 Someone without apparent authority may possess legal 
authority; someone with apparent authority may lack legal 
authority.194 The mere bystander, dropping around for business 
purposes, may turn out to be the landlord who owns the apartment. 
The soccer-mum at the door may turn out to be a squatter, refusing to 
abide by her court-ratified eviction. 
Justice Kennedy’s social, “customary” understanding of property 
seems especially important in cases in which a party claims to enjoy 
joint control over some thing or place. In a series of cases discussing 
whether someone without a lawful property interest could consent to 
the search of a building, the Court held that property interests were not 
determinative of (or even dominant for) the ability to give consent.195 
Instead, the question was framed primarily in terms of privacy.196 
What mattered to the Court in Georgia v. Randolph was “widely 
shared social expectations,”197 echoing Justice Harlan, in his Katz 
concurrence, who defined the right to privacy in terms of 
“expectation[s] . . . that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”198 These social expectations, however, appear to track 
interpersonal relationships—the sort of authority others give us to 
 
 190. 68 AM. JUR. 2d Searches and Seizures § 156, Westlaw (2009). 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. See id. 
 195. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186–90 (1990); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 352–54 (1967). 
 196. See, e.g., Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 115 (2006). 
 197. Id. at 111. 
 198. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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make decisions on their behalf (and so may be analogous to agency, 
rather than property relations).199 
Thus, for example, in Randolph, property rights are included as 
an eligible source for interpreting privacy rights, but they are not the 
dominant one.200 Part of the reason is that property imperfectly tracks 
the interests that co-tenants have in their residence.201 On one view of 
the right to exclude, what matters is the sort of authority the person 
present exercises over some place or item. The source of that authority 
may derive from the relations of persons to each other (sometimes 
framed in terms of agency relations, but also in terms of marriage, or 
being a guest, and so on), rather than in terms of persons to property 
through the law or lawlike concepts.202 
Customary, shared understandings of the “mutual use” of some 
place or thing thus need not track the law of property, but rather the 
norms of agency, or even of etiquette or familial intimacy. All these 
sources of privacy satisfy the Rakas demand that they be found outside 
the Fourth Amendment.203 
Here we have a limitation of the neutral-principles argument. 
While the choice of a principle may be neutral in the sense of “legal” 
rather than “moral” or “economic,” that principle may not be neutral 
in the sense of “uniquely required.” The judge may still have 
discretion to choose from amongst the available principles. 
Choice among applicable legal principles can occur on various 
levels. A decision-maker may be able to choose among doctrines and 
choose within doctrines. There is a choice among doctrines if, for 
example, property is not the only available doctrine applicable as a 
 
 199. See, e.g., United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974) (“Common authority is, 
of course, not to be implied from the mere property interest a third party has in the property. The 
authority which justifies the third-party consent does not rest upon the law of property, with its 
attendant historical and legal refinements, . . . but rests rather on mutual use of the property by 
persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to 
recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and 
that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be 
searched.”). 
 200. See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 111. 
 201. See, e.g., id. at 114. 
 202. Cf. Fernandez v. California, 571 U.S. 292, 307 (2014) (holding that “the lawful occupant 
of a house or apartment should have the right to invite the police to enter the dwelling and conduct 
a search.” (emphasis added)). Justice Alito authored the majority opinion in Fernandez, so it is 
consistent with his other property-based jurisprudence that he applied a lawful occupant (rather 
than customary perception) standard. See, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 16–26 (2013) (Alito, 
J., dissenting). 
 203. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978). 
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principle of interpretation external to the Fourth Amendment. For 
example, tort law and its notions of privacy and publicity may also 
apply.204 There is a choice within doctrines if the doctrine itself 
contains multiple eligible options for the decision-maker to select 
among. Having selected property, why prioritize one aspect of 
property—control and the right to exclude—over others? Thus, even 
if the first-order principle—property law—is neutral in the sense of 
“legal” as opposed to “extra-legal,” these other, second-order choice-
guiding principles may not be. Worse, focusing on the first-order 
principle may give an undeserved patina of legitimacy to judicial fiat. 
In an act of interpretative prestidigitation, the judge gets to say, “hey, 
look, my governing principle is boring old property law,” while 
drawing our attention away from the raw political or moral decision to 
pick property law in the first place, or to emphasize one among 
competing, differently consequential, property-law conceptions. 
Property provides a ready-made template for bundling together a 
group of concepts that is helpful when thinking about the sort of 
security or privacy guaranteed to civilians by the Fourth Amendment. 
Possession of some object comes prepackaged, on the property 
analysis, with the right to control that item, and the power to exclude 
others from its use.205 Property law is not the only account of control 
and exclusion that the law contains, however. Tort law famously does 
too206 (but so might family law in the case of joint authority, or even 
the rules of etiquette). Indeed, it was tort law’s concepts of privacy 
that provided the dominant interpretation of Fourth Amendment 
security for the last fifty years.207 
Privacy also contains a right to exclude—not merely physical 
persons, but also prying eyes and ears. These privacy concepts are part 
of a broader tort scheme that regulates, not merely intrusions upon 
some individual’s secure spaces, but also the ways in which third 
parties may use the public manifestations of some individual’s 
personality.208 And concepts, such as trespass, control, and exclusion, 
that apply in privacy law also have their cognates in tort. It is unclear, 
 
 204. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 205. 63C AM. JUR. 2D Property § 33, Westlaw (2009). 
 206. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1890). 
 207. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 208. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 206. 
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unless the Court specifies, whether the Court is relying on privacy or 
property as a first-order interpretive principle. 
There is another reason for worrying that property can serve as a 
first-order neutral principle. Property should operate to determine any 
question of interpretation arising under the Fourth Amendment. 
Possession, control, and the right to exclude, along with the associated 
property concepts of trespass, custody, bailments, and easements are, 
however, insufficient to explain a whole carve-out of Fourth 
Amendment law: the open fields doctrine. When a property owner 
erects a sign expressly asserting their possession and control of an area 
of real property, that property is one of their “effects”; and the signage 
expressly indicates their decision to exclude uninvited guests. 
Ordinary individuals would be subject to prosecution (criminally or 
civilly) for their trespass. It is the police, alone, who are granted an 
easement. 
The mere fact that an individual could unlawfully intrude upon 
the property does not render trespass any less significant, as a property 
concept. Just as the fact that a passerby could interfere, unlawfully, 
with my backpack or my car does not render my property interest in it 
any less determinative of their trespass or theft. The tripartite 
distinction between open fields, curtilage, and house is thus not a 
distinction within property concepts, but within privacy ones. 
C.  The Plurality of Property Concepts 
The problem Justice Kennedy faces in miniature in his opinion in 
Byrd is one that pits the different property-dominant Justices on the 
Court against each other. Even if property concepts are allowed to 
determine the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment or the 
reasonable expectation of privacy, it is worth asking: which property 
concepts? The Court has a number of options. It could turn to the 
English common law at 1791, when the Fourth Amendment was 
ratified, and adopt a Blackstonian or colonial interpretation of property 
law. Or the Court could turn to current law to provide its property 
concepts. If the Court does not like overly legalistic approaches, then 
it could turn to philosophical or sociological accounts of property 
concepts and use those to help interpret the Fourth Amendment. 
However, each of these approaches presents disadvantages as an 
interpretative device. 
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For example, if the Court relies on Blackstone or the law of the 
Colonies during the revolutionary era, then the Court must reject the 
“customary understandings” of property law approach, unless these 
customary understandings are the understandings of legal technicians 
or the founding generation. It is doubtful that many contemporary 
Americans—including many criminal law practitioners or police 
officers—are familiar with Blackstone or Colonial Era property laws. 
Indeed, it seems clear from Justice Kennedy’s and Justice Scalia’s 
rejection of the common law of property that they had a different 
source of property law in mind.209 Justices Thomas,210 Alito,211 and 
perhaps Gorsuch,212 however, seem more amenable to the common 
law approach.213 
If contemporary understandings are to be our guide, then we have 
to wrestle with the problem that fifty states have their own laws of 
property. Even if these states’ property regimes share rough 
similarities, they also share broad differences. For example, to 
determine who is entitled to refuse entry to some house, we might have 
to consider the question of common ownership. In that case, the 
western states, with their community property regime, are very 
different from eastern and midwestern states.214 And Louisianans are 
likely to have rather different property understandings from the rest of 
us.215 
Picking and choosing among the fifty states’ contemporary 
property law would run afoul of the Court’s rejection of a localized 
Fourth Amendment. As the Court put matters in Virginia v. Moore,216 
“linking Fourth Amendment protections to state law would cause them 
to ‘vary from place to place and from time to time.’ Even at the same 
place and time, the Fourth Amendment’s protections might vary if 
federal officers were not subject to the same statutory constraints as 
state officers.”217 To remain consistent, the Court requires a non-local 
 
 209. See Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1527 (2018). 
 210. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2235–46 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 211. See id. at 2246–61 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 212. See id. at 2261–72 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 213. Even on this approach, there is a second-order interpretative question: whether a decision-
maker should choose Blackstone or the one of the property regimes of the thirteen colonies, if those 
regimes diverge on a given question of property. 
 214. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 799 S.W.2d 398, 400 (Tex. App. 1990). 
 215. See, e.g., State v. Woods, 526 So. 2d 443, 445 (La. Ct. App. 1988). 
 216. 553 U.S. 164 (2008). 
 217. Id. at 176 (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815 (1996)). 
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source of property law. That preference explains, in part, the attraction 
of the originalist approach: Blackstone provides a common, if 
outdated, property law regime.218 
The property-dominant interpretation could turn outside the law, 
to a philosophical or sociological concept of property. That approach 
fits with the Court’s emphasis on the rights to exclude and control as 
characteristic of property law. But even this approach has its problems. 
For example, the concept of property is hotly contested as a 
philosophical matter. To take just two approaches that the Founders 
would have found familiar: should we adopt a Humean approach to 
property as artificial bundle of rights219 (which has found a more 
modern endorsement in Hohfeld’s account of property rights220) or 
should we follow Locke and treat property as grounded in certain 
natural rights?221 
These are only a few of the philosophical options. There are yet 
more potential property approaches,222 and these have significant 
consequences for the way in which we approach individual rights. If 
the Court is empowered to pick among these different, conflicting, 
second-order interpretative visions of property rights, then the neutral 
principles approach fails, and with it one of the major attractions of 
the property solution to Fourth Amendment interpretation. 
Instead, the Court could simply attempt to discern empirically 
what property concepts people have. This sort of empirical or 
sociological, non-technical understanding of property interests has the 
advantage of administrability. Ordinary people do not need to know 
the law of property or the rule against perpetuities in order to know 
their Fourth Amendment rights. And neither do the police. The Court 
has elsewhere rejected technical approaches to Fourth Amendment 
concepts: in their definitions of “probable cause”223 and 
 
 218. Albert W. Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1996). Again, if 
the laws of the separate Colonial Era states are chosen, then we might have plural property regimes. 
 219. George E. Panichas, Hume’s Theory of Property, 69 ARCHIVES FOR PHIL. L. & SOC. PHIL., 
391 (1983). 
 220. Henry E. Smith, Property Is Not Just a Bundle of Rights, 8 ECON. J. WATCH 279, 280 
(2011) (noting that the bundle of rights theory builds on Hohfeld). 
 221. David Schultz, The Locke Republican Debate and the Paradox of Property Rights in Early 
American Jurisprudence, 13 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 155, 155–56 (1991). 
 222. See, e.g., Timothy M. Mulvaney, Progressive Property Moving Forward, 5 CAL. L. REV. 
CIR. 349 (2014) (discussing a conception of property grounded in property’s social nature, rather 
than in liberal individualism). 
 223. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983). 
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“reasonableness.”224 These shared social, commonsense 
understandings of property law seem relatively easy to discern and 
apply. Furthermore, Justice Kennedy endorsed the social, “customary” 
understanding of property in Byrd225 and in Carpenter.226 He is quite 
clear in Byrd that he does not interpret “privacy” using a common-law 
or legalistic understanding of property concepts.227 He repeatedly 
insists that what matters are not common law understandings, but 
something more general and less technical.228 Thus, his understanding 
of property appears closest to the sociological approach than to any of 
the others so far canvassed. 
However, Justice Kennedy’s non-technical understanding of 
property threatens to return us to the empirical morass characteristic 
of the privacy debate, instead of liberating us from it. Custom is 
custom, whether it is customary beliefs about property or about 
privacy. Once we turn to an empirical, non-technical approach to 
Fourth Amendment doctrine, then the Court is back in the business of 
projecting the Justices’ Fourth Amendment predilections onto the 
public. Judicial fiat, rather than some neutral principle, determines 
what “customary” property understanding wins the day. 
Property was supposed to be more attractive than privacy because 
it was neutrally normative, rather than partisanly empirical.229 
However, even among the Justices, there is little agreement upon what 
property concepts to apply. In the past six years, five Justices have 
expressed radically different views of the application of property 
concepts to the Fourth Amendment. Justice Thomas has taken the 
most “originalist” approach, arguing that only tangible property rights 
are covered by the Fourth Amendment and that privacy rights are not 
covered at all.230 Justice Alito has adopted a legalistic account of 
 
 224. Ryburn v. Huff, 565 U.S. 469, 477 (2012). 
 225. Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1527 (2018). 
 226. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 227. Byrd, 138 S. Ct. at 1527. 
 228. Id. 1522 (“[A] person need not always have a recognized common-law property interest 
in the place searched to be able to claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in it.”) ; id. at 1526 
(quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978)) (“Expectations of privacy protected by 
the Fourth Amendment, of course, need not be based on a common-law interest in real or personal 
property, or on the invasion of such an interest.”). 
 229. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2264 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 230. Id. at 2236 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting). I put “originalist” in scare quotes, in part 
because his interpretation of property does not do justice either to the historical period he presumes 
to interpret, which had a much more diverse set of philosophical influences than he acknowledges, 
many of which were critical of the Lockean approach he adopts. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 
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property rights, arguing that legal, or common law property concepts 
should prevail.231 Justice Gorsuch asserts that property concepts ought 
to apply, although he is not sure which ones do, and how they do.232 
Even Justice Scalia, who led the charge to transform the Fourth 
Amendment with a property-dominant approach,233 picked the 
“common law” understanding of property associated with Justice 
Alito in Jones,234 and in Jardines235 switched to the customary 
approach adopted by Justice Kennedy. In Jardines, as in Carpenter, 
Justice Alito dissented, serving as the defender of the common law 
approach against rival customary approach, and in so doing 
demonstrating the consequential difference that the choice of second-
order interpretative property understanding can make for the outcome 
of criminal procedure cases.236 
Property takes us no further towards a neutral interpretation of 
Fourth Amendment protections than privacy did. The fault lies not 
with these other concepts, but rather with the Fourth Amendment 
itself. The Fourth Amendment calls for a directly normative 
interpretation of the state’s police interaction with civilians, resting as 
it does on inherently vague concepts like “reasonableness” or 
“security.” The better approach would be to recognize the normative 
valence of these concepts and develop a jurisprudence to address 
them. 
IV.  THE POLICE AS PUBLIC INSTITUTION 
Trooper Long did not mention Byrd’s race.237 Nor, indeed, do any 
of the pleadings or court opinions. Nonetheless, the fourth reason 
 
(Alexander Hamilton). And in part, because the interpretation of Lochner to which he most 
explicitly cites, Professor Morgan Cloud adopts a much more expansive reading of “property” than 
does Justice Thomas. Compare Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. (Thomas, J., dissenting), with Morgan Cloud, 
The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy, Property, and Liberty in Constitutional 
Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555 (1996). 
 231. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2247–48 (Alito, J., dissenting); Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 
1518, 1531–32 (2018) (Alito, J., concurring); Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 16, 26 (2013) (Alito, 
J., dissenting); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 420–21 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 232. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2261–72 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 233. See, e.g., Jones, 565 U.S. at 404–05; Jardines, 569 U.S. at 5–8. 
 234. Jones, 565 U.S. at 420–21. 
 235. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 7, 23. 
 236. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting); Florida v. 
Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 237. Joint Appendix, Defendant’s Exhibit No. 12, 12-A, Screenshots of Terminal Display, Byrd 
v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518 (2017) (No. 16-1371). 
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Trooper Long might have singled out Terrence Byrd for drug 
interdiction on Highway 81 outside Harrisburg, Pennsylvania is one 
employed by too many law enforcement officials on our highways: 
Terrence Byrd is an African American man.238 
Race is super-salient for law-enforcement officials:239 the sort of 
factor that overdetermines their response to the actions of African 
American civilians.240 Race works to explain (though not justify) 
police activity, even when the police do not know that race is 
functioning to determine their decision-making process.241 Race 
operates for the police as a reason both to initiate interactions with the 
public and structure that interaction in ways that focus on interdiction 
rather than traffic stops.242 Race explains (though does not justify) 
why a law-enforcement official’s attention is drawn to one group of 
individuals rather than another,243 or one driver rather than another in 
a five-vehicle traffic line (race’s targeting harm).244 Race explains 
(though does not justify) why an officer’s response may be more 
intrusive once an individual is targeted: why the decision may be to 
engage in a pretextual stop on suspicion of drugs (the discrimination 
harm).245 Race may even explain (though does not justify) why the 
suspects that law-enforcement officials stop have outstanding 
warrants: because they have been profiled in this way in the past, and 
 
 238. Id. 
 239. EPP ET AL., supra note 27, at 14 (“In speeding stops, the most important influence on who 
is stopped is how fast you drive. In investigatory stops, the most important influence on who is 
stopped is not what you do but who you are: young black men are by far the most likely to be 
stopped.”). 
 240. See, e.g., Devon Carbado & Patrick Rock, What Exposes African Americans to Police 
Violence?, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. LIBERTIES L. REV. 160 (2016); Frank Rudy Cooper, “Who’s the 
Man?”: Masculinities Studies, Terry Stops, and Police Training, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 671 
(2009); Cynthia Lee, Reasonableness with Teeth: The Future of Fourth Amendment 
Reasonableness Analysis, 81 MISS. L.J., 1133, 1150 (2012); L. Song Richardson, Implicit Racial 
Bias and Racial Anxiety: Implications for Stops and Frisks, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 73 (2017); 
Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, supra note 70, at 982. 
 241. L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 
2035, 2044–47 (2011). Race functions in this way explicitly or implicitly, consciously or 
unconsciously. 
 242. Id. at 2044–47 (2011) (discussing the manner in which an officer’s implicit biases can 
impact the determination of Fourth Amendment reasonableness). 
 243. Id. 
 244. See Tracey L. Meares, Terry and the Relevance of Politics, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1343, 
1348–49 (1998); William J. Stuntz, Terry’s Impossibility, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1213, 1218 
(1998); Colb, supra note 70. 
 245. Colb, supra note 70. 
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ticketed, and failed to pay the ticket (the ratcheting harm).246 And race 
explains (though does not justify) why law-enforcement officials more 
easily discount minority motorists’ interests in not being stopped in 
the first place (but also in avoiding lengthy, public detentions) (the 
citizenship harm).247 Finally, race operates to silence minority drivers 
who might wish to challenge the stop without risking physical 
violence (the resentment harm).248 
The police undertake the mass policing of motorists and 
pedestrians as part of deliberate, institutional, law-enforcement 
programs. Mass policing is aggregative, rather than individualized.249 
It is “a numbers game; you have to stop a lot of vehicles to get the law 
of averages working in your favor.”250 The goal is simply to gather 
sufficient vehicles to stop so as to hit the jackpot. 
The Court has not made much of an effort to understand the nature 
of the police as an institution. The police are first and foremost public 
officials: they are members of a distinct institution (or set of 
institutions) within the executive branch of government and serve to 
represent and enforce state authority.251 For the most part, however, 
the Court has only obliquely wrestled with the institutionalized nature 
of police authority. The Court has more directly debated the manner 
in which the Warrant Clause does or does not justify ex ante 
interbranch regulation by the judiciary of the police;252 or (relatedly) 
 
 246. BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING 
IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 147 (2007) (“The logic of the ratchet in the policing context is simple: if 
the police dedicate more resources to investigating, searching, and arresting members of a 
[particular] group, the resulting distribution of arrests (between profiled and nonprofiled persons) 
will disproportionately represent members of that [particular] group.”). 
 247. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 210 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The police 
not only carry legitimate authority but also exercise power free from immediate check, and when 
the attention of several officers is brought to bear on one civilian the imbalance of immediate power 
is unmistakable.”); Bennett Capers, Criminal Procedure and the Good Citizen, 118 COLUM. L. 
REV. 653, 689–90 (2018); EPP ET AL., supra note 27, at 60–61. 
 248. P.F. STRAWSON, FREEDOM AND RESENTMENT AND OTHER ESSAYS 5 (Routledge ed. 
2008); Kate Manne, Humanism: A Critique, 42 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 389, 402–03 (2016). 
 249. EPP ET AL., supra note 27, at 36. 
 250. Id. at 39. 
 251. See, e.g., JOHN KLEINIG, THE ETHICS OF POLICING 11–15 (1996). 
 252. Compare Berger v. State of New York, 388 U.S. 41, 54–55 (1967) (rejecting 
indiscriminate warrantless electronic searches), Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) 
(citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481–82 (1963)) (describing Constitution as 
requiring “that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer . . . be interposed between the 
citizen and the police”), and United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951) (“Over and again  this 
Court has emphasized that the mandate of the (Fourth) Amendment requires adherence to judicial 
processes.”), with United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 897 (1984) (permitting good faith exception 
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whether the police, as a more or less professional body of crime-
fighters, ought to be regulated by the judiciary at all;253 or the right of 
right of civilians to prevent the police from interfering with their 
privacy or property.254 
Nor has the Court taken much of an interest in the nature of 
policing. Policing is necessarily about the power of the state to 
regulate the public, and the ways in which that power reaches its 
limits.255 The activity of policing is not simply “the stuff the police 
do.”256 Other officials and agencies engage in policing segments of the 
public: most notably school teachers257 and public employers,258 but 
also including private security providers, administrative agencies 
(such as the Environmental Protection Agency or the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration), and a host of other institutions.259 
And the sort of stuff the police do goes beyond simply fighting 
crime.260 It includes enforcing school rules,261 or building codes,262 or 
work regulations,263 all of which may be captured under the core 
policing function of ensuring good order, which is increasingly 
conceptualized as a form of risk management.264 Much of this “good 
order” stuff is simply not captured by the criminal law, but requires 
 
to warrant requirement), and California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“[T]he ‘warrant requirement’ ha[s] become so riddled with exceptions that it [i]s 
basically unrecognizable.”). 
 253. See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006). 
 254. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2206 (2018); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 
400, 400 (2012); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 785 (1971); Katz, 389 U.S. at 360–61 
(Harlan, J., concurring). 
 255. MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, THE POLICE POWER: PATRIARCHY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 3–5 (2005) (discussing policing power as a distinctive form of social 
governance). 
 256. JEAN-PAUL BRODEUR, THE POLICING WEB 40–41 (2010); Michael D. Reisig et al., 
Suspect Disrespect Toward the Police, 21 JUST. Q. 241–42 (2004). 
 257. Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995); Safford Unified Sch. Dist. 
v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 368 (2009); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 325–26 (1985). 
 258. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 633–34 (1989). 
 259. BRODEUR, supra note 256, at 17–42. 
 260. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). 
 261. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 368 (2009); Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 
U.S. at 646. 
 262. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 523 (1967). 
 263. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 602. 
 264. BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN 
WINDOWS POLICING 162–63 (2001); DUBBER, supra note 255, at 71–73. 
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the police to act upon their general duty to govern in cases of public 
nuisance265 or more or less serious emergency.266 
The confounding factor is community pushback: stopping too 
many individuals with sufficient social capital or political power, who 
might exert sufficient influence to introduce oversight of the program 
or terminate it.267 Accordingly, the police do not stop everyone 
equally.268 Instead, the police engage in what might be called (stealing 
a turn of phrase from Berkeley sociologist Löic Wacquant) 
hyperinvestigation.269 The problem is not simply mass policing and 
investigation, which would suggest that everyone is equally vulnerable 
to being targeted, stopped, searched, and arrested.270 Instead, the 
problem is hyperinvestigation, which targets individuals based on 
their class, race, and place.271 
The property-based approach reinforces this disinterest in the 
police and policing by treating law enforcement as an episodic activity 
organized around atomistic encounters between the police and the 
public. The Fourth Amendment does not trigger, on the property 
analysis, unless the police interfere with some discrete individual’s 
distinctive property right. Jardines is instructive here. Under the 
majority’s customary approach, the Fourth Amendment only comes 
into play if the police walk down the path to the doorway with a drug-
sniffing dog.272 According to Justice Alito, the Fourth Amendment 
 
 265. See, e.g., Stuart, 547 U.S. at 400–03. 
 266. JOHN KLEINIG, ETHICS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: AN INTRODUCTION 57 (2008); Eric J. 
Miller, A Fair Cop and a Fair Trial in OBSTACLES TO FAIRNESS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS: 
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND INSTITUTIONAL FORMS 253 (John Jackson & Sarah Summers eds., 
2018). Debra Livingston calls these sorts of instances of police action “community caretaking.” See 
Debra Livingston, Police, Community Caretaking, and the Fourth Amendment, 1998 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 261, 261 (1998). 
 267. Bernard E. Harcourt & Tracey L. Meares, Randomization and the Fourth Amendment, 78 
U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 859 (2011). 
 268. See id. at 854–59. 
 269. See Löic Wacquant, Class, Race & Hyperincarceration in Revanchist America, 139 
DAEDALUS 74, 78 (2010) (describing the targeting of individuals by class, race, and place). 
 270. See also EPP ET AL., supra note 27, at 39 (“[O]fficers cannot possibly stop all drivers, and 
they cannot possibly search every vehicle that they stop: officers must focus on some, and the race 
of the driver figures prominently in many discussions of where to focus.”) . Compare Wacquant, 
supra note 269, at 78 (Wacquant rejects the term “mass incarceration” because it mistakenly 
“suggests that confinement concerns large swaths of the citizenry . . . implying that the penal net 
has been flung far and wide across social and physical space.”), with Wacquant, supra note 269, at 
78 (suggesting the process of criminal prosecution and confinement is targeted on particular 
populations, in particular, poor African American men).  
 271. Wacquant, supra note 269, at 78. 
 272. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 9 (2013). 
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does not regulate even that activity: the police may presumably adopt 
a drug interdiction program in which canine units regularly and 
repeatedly patrol for drugs in the front gardens of some 
neighborhood’s residences.273 But even under the majority’s property 
approach, the police may adopt a policy of high-intensity, canine-
based drug interdiction in a minority neighborhood.274 So long as the 
police do not intrude upon the curtilage of anyone’s house, they may 
saturate the streets with officers and drug sniffing dogs, screening 
individuals as they walk in and out of their front gates or apartment 
doors.275 Uniformed, armed officers may even ask every member of 
the public for consent to search their belongings as the dogs engage in 
their sniff, so long as the officers do not act in such a way that a 
reasonable, innocent member of the public would no longer feel free 
to go about their business.276 Jardines’s property-based analysis has 
nothing to say about this style of policing. 
On this episodic understanding of the Fourth Amendment, one 
encounter is treated as having no bearing on the next.277 However, this 
atomistic approach to the police and policing does not reflect actual 
police practice.278 Instead, the police, as an institution, adopt more or 
less explicit policies for many of their law enforcement activities, and 
especially highway drug interdiction.279 An institutional approach to 
the police and the Fourth Amendment would take police policy and 
practice into consideration when determining the permissibility of 
police crime-fighting practices. 
 
 273. Id. at 16–17. 
 274. See id. at 6. 
 275. Id. at 6, 11–12. 
 276. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991). 
 277. This episodic approach is also reflected in the Court’s probable cause and reasonable 
suspicion jurisprudence. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 698 (1996) (quoting Illinois 
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 n.11 (1983) (“It is true that because the mosaic which is analyzed for 
a reasonable-suspicion or probable-cause inquiry is multi-faceted, ‘one determination will seldom 
be a useful “precedent” for another’”); see also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 275 (2002) 
(“[I]n many instances the factual ‘mosaic’ analyzed for a reasonable-suspicion determination would 
preclude one case from squarely controlling another.”). 
 278. See generally P.A.J. WADDINGTON, POLICING CITIZENS: POLICE, POWER AND THE STATE 
17–20 (1999) (policing is defined, not by isolated encounters, but by the nature of the authority 
wielded by the police). 
 279. EPP ET AL., supra note 27, at 11. 
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A.  The Police Role 
The police are persons who have a specific institutional role, with 
certain rights and duties that are constitutive of it. They are executive 
officials who uphold the authority of the state. The police role requires 
the police to protect the public, to promote social welfare, and to 
maintain order. While engaged in these activities, the police must 
often engage with other people on the street. 
Police activity is an expression of the political engagement of the 
state or municipality with those persons who reside within its 
jurisdiction. The sort of consideration the police extend tells us a great 
deal about the way in which the polity values its members. Policing 
can undermine or support a person’s individual moral standing and 
shared civic bonds: the ways they values themself, and both values 
and is valued by their community. 
Policing is one way of establishing, not only the value of 
individuals, but of groups or communities as well: as a collective 
entity that matters to the state and to the larger polity.280 The quantity 
and quality of police engagement with the community as the place in 
which we “become sociable or communal men and women”281 has 
tremendous practical and expressive value in constituting the civic 
bonds within that community. For example, historically marginalized 
groups often complain about too much police contact.282 However, 
these groups usually object primarily to the sort of policing that 
undermines individual dignity and safety or compromises community 
cohesion: police violence or the over-criminalization of petty crime.283 
On the other hand, these same groups often complain about too little 
policing: about the withdrawal of essential police services, including 
order-maintenance and crime-fighting.284 On this account, the 
problems of too much and too little contact with the police are both 
sides of the same coin: the problem of overpolicing, like the problem 
of underpolicing, becomes particularly pressing when the police fail 
 
 280. See, e.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1717–18 
(2006). 
 281. See Michael Walzer, The Civil Society Argument in GROUP RIGHTS: PERSPECTIVES SINCE 
1900 299, 308 (Julia Stapleton ed., 1995). 
 282. Natapoff, supra note 280, at 1716. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. at 1729–30. 
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to recognize the moral and political value of the communities they 
interact with or abandon.285 
The police may treat some people or communities with contempt, 
and others with extreme solicitude. In this way, the police become “the 
enemy” or “our” police, serving some and excluding others.286 This 
sort of partisanship is a deep problem for policing.287 It operates as a 
conceptual limit upon “the police” itself, and as a normative limit upon 
police legitimacy. 
To take the conceptual point first: the police are the institution 
that represents and enforces state authority on the streets.288 Partisan 
police are, at the extreme case, not properly police at all. The police 
are, first and foremost, public officials: members of the executive 
branch of government. They serve the whole public, not some subset 
of it. They owe to everyone, equally, duties to protect and to observe 
the rule of law. This is a logical and conceptual feature of the police 
given their role in the executive branch. The conceptual question is 
thus different from the sociological one: what do people who are 
deputized by the state or municipality do when they wander about in 
police uniforms? The conceptual question is whether what they do 
when wandering about in those uniforms is something that they do in 
the role of police. 
One way of raising the issue of legitimacy is to worry, not (only) 
that the state under-polices, but that the state or municipality fails to 
provide certain communities with police at all. The people wandering 
about in uniforms are not acting on the duties they owe as public 
servants, to everyone, equally. Instead they are acting in a partisan 
capacity, seeking to protect and treat with respect only the “good” 
people in the community, much in the same way as vigilantes or hired 
guns would do. In this “gunman” mode,289 the police, though perhaps 
 
 285. DAVID A. SKLANSKY, DEMOCRACY AND THE POLICE 133 (2008); Walzer, supra note 281, 
at 308. 
 286. See, e.g., EVI GIRLING ET AL., CRIME AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MIDDLE ENGLAND: 
QUESTIONS OF ORDER IN AN ENGLISH TOWN 132–33 (2005) (discussing notion of “our” police). 
 287. See, e.g., IAN LOADER & NEIL WALKER, CIVILIZING SECURITY 73 (2007) (describing 
police partisanship as “a means of fortifying either the interests of the state itself, or those of 
constituencies favored by the present configuration of economic and social relations.”). 
 288. WADDINGTON, supra note 278, at 20 (“What the police do, as opposed to have the 
potential to do, is exercise authority.”); KLEINIG, supra note 251, at 19, 91–93. 
 289. H.L.A. Hart famously claimed that the criminal law cannot be “the gunman situation writ 
large.” H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 7 (3d. ed. 2012). 
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acting as authorized by the state, are not acting as “real” police.290 
They are a “degenerate example of a police officer, or . . . a police 
officer not worthy of the name.”291 
The police are particularly prone to being compromised in this 
way.292 Sometimes the state itself is partisan and uses its executive 
power to repress those segments of the community that challenge its 
power. Sometimes the community is partisan, seeking to maintain 
order on behalf of some residents and not on behalf of others. In these 
communities, one group of community members may appeal to the 
police in the guise of “law-abiders,” encouraging the police to root out 
the “law-breakers” who engage in deviant conduct within the 
neighborhood.293 In that case, the police represent some faction of the 
community, one that dominates the rest of the community despite their 
obligation to treat everyone impartially. In this sort of partisan society, 
we might worry that the state has failed its citizens in a particularly 
problematic way.294 
The fact that the police are particularly prone to being coopted in 
the service of repression has led some scholars to think that coercion 
and repression are central to policing.295 These scholars tend to agree 
with one of the great modern students of policing, Egon Bittner, who 
suggests that the police are defined by their legal permission to deploy 
coercive force, ignoring other more facilitative aspects of police 
authority.296 But this emphasis on the police as only or primarily 
agents of violence or coercion fails to acknowledge the public, 
political character of the police as agents of the state. It cannot 
distinguish between the police and, for example, vigilantes or 
organized crime groups, such as the Mafia. When these groups assume 
 
 290. See JOHN GARDNER, Criminals in Uniform, in 114 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE CRIMINAL 
LAW 97, 105 (R.A. Duff et al. eds., 2013), on the claim that the police, even when acting for the 
state, may nonetheless not count as “real” police. 
 291. Id. 
 292. See, e.g., WADDINGTON, supra note 278, at 40. 
 293. See, e.g., Natapoff, supra note 280, at 1718. 
 294. See Lisa L. Miller, What’s Violence Got to Do with It? Inequality, Punishment, and State 
Failure in US Politics, 17 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 184, 186–89 (2015), on the idea of a “failed state” 
where the state’s punitive orientation targets certain vulnerable groups for discriminatory treatment. 
 295. See, e.g., PETER K. MANNING, DEMOCRATIC POLICING IN A CHANGING WORLD 4 (2010) 
(discussing Bittner’s formulation of policing as a form of force); WADDINGTON, supra note 278, at 
20. 
 296. Bittner claims “the question, ‘What are policemen supposed to do?’ is almost completely 
identical with the question, ‘What kinds of situations require remedies that are non-negotiably 
coercible?’” See EGON BITTNER, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE POLICE IN MODERN SOCIETY 41 (1970). 
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the role of ensuring public order in the communities they control, they 
do not become “the police” just because they provide similar services 
to a municipal police force. Partisanship explains why: the agents of 
organized crime represent their crime boss or their criminal institution, 
not the state. Vigilantes represent the “good” residents, not all of us. 
The coercive criteria also cannot distinguish between private 
security guards, which are often called “private police,” and public 
police officers. Both exist to coerce individuals, and this may be their 
sole role. But private security guards are not the police297—they owe 
their allegiance to the people who employ them (corporations, 
neighborhood groups, landlords, and the like); and the police are not 
private actors—they owe their allegiance to the state and are precisely 
not supposed to serve as enforcers on behalf of some corporation or 
subgroup within their jurisdiction. That, indeed, is one way to tell the 
difference between the two. 
B.  Externalizing the Costs of Policing 
Hyperinvestigation provides a one-way ratchet ensuring that 
“upscale” and “downscale” communities298 differentiated by race, 
class, and geography receive radically different cultural experiences 
of enforcement.299 In upscale—rich, suburban, mostly white—
communities “the image of the policeman is the friendly face of the 
school crossing guard. From childhood [upscale individuals] are 
reared to see government and law enforcement as benign. They pose 
no threat to us.”300 Because upscale communities possess the social 
capital necessary to exert power over the law enforcement process, 
they can externalize the costs of policing so that they experience no 
enforcement impact of the criminal law. It is as if those laws did not 
 
 297. For more on private policing, see, for example, Elizabeth E. Joh, The Paradox of Private 
Policing, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 49 (2004). 
 298. “[B]y ‘poor’ or ‘lower-class’ or ‘downscale’ communities, I mean communities in which 
unemployment is high, legally acquired wealth and income are low, and educational and social 
resources are below par. By ‘rich’ or ‘upper-class’ or ‘upscale’ communities, I mean communities 
that have the opposite characteristics.” William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1795, 1801 (1998). 
 299. See, e.g., GIRLING ET AL., supra note 286, at 137 (discussing upscale individuals’ sense of 
themselves as the proper recipients of police services). 
 300. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 
400 (1974). 
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apply to them.301 Downscale communities, by contrast, lack the social 
capital to mitigate the costs of policing.302 
Institutional approaches to policing in these different 
communities may be radically dissimilar. The people doing the 
policing may be different, with upscale communities relying on 
private security and downscale communities dependent on public 
police. Private security tends to engage in what Elizabeth Joh calls 
“compliance-based policing”: preventing violations of the law from 
happening rather than responding to violations once they have 
happened by arresting offenders.303 Some upscale residents of those 
communities employing private security services may exercise a great 
deal of control over the people they employ to do their policing.304 
Others may not recognize that the people policing them are private, 
rather than public, police.305 
Accordingly, the tendency to externalize the effects of policing 
may be profound in upscale neighborhoods both because of the 
different types of crimes that may be committed, but also because of 
 
 301. Stuntz is acutely aware of the dissonance between legislative, executive, and social norms. 
Actually, the problem is worse still. Given enforcement discretion, criminal statutes need 
not have majority support in the citizenry to have majority support in the legislature. 
Suppose a quarter of the population believes strongly that all lies should be crimes; many 
of those who hold this view would consider it one of the two or three most important 
factors in deciding for whom to vote. The other three-quarters of the population 
disagrees, but those who hold this more tolerant view care less about what the law is than 
about whether they will themselves be prosecuted for lying. Almost none of them will. 
And when such (rare) prosecutions do happen, the majority will blame not the legislature 
that voted for the anti-lying statute, but the prosecutors who enforced it . . . . Under these 
circumstances, a self-interested legislature might happily criminalize all lies, since it 
would gain far more than it would lose by doing so. Which means that legislative crime 
definition, which should be supermajoritarian, isn’t even reliably majoritarian. 
William J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1894 (2000). He suggests, 
however, that such dissonance, in the drug sphere at any rate, is not racially motivated. I believe 
the story is not so simple as that. 
 302. Paul Butler, The Evil of American Criminal Justice: A Reply, 44 UCLA L. REV. 143, 156 
(1996). 
 303. Joh, supra note 297, at 79–80. 
 304. See, e.g., Philip C. Stenning, Powers and Accountability of Private Police, 8 EUR. J. CRIM. 
POL’Y & RES. 325, 345 (2000) (discussing ways in which customers will shift private security 
companies based upon their views of the policing practices they experience). 
 305. See, e.g., Joh, supra note 297 (suggesting that even if the private security officers also 
primarily work as public police (and so are moonlighting when policing in a private capacity), those 
officers nonetheless act differently, not least by performing less arrests than they might if they acted 
in their public capacity). 
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the different institutions doing the policing and the different sorts of 
control exercised over these institutions.306 
Differences in the financial wellbeing and social organization of 
upscale and downscale communities can also produce differences in 
the sorts of criminal activity they experience. Crimes come in different 
forms, and upscale crimes (such as embezzlement and insider trading), 
and downscale crimes (burglary and auto theft) are often location-
driven in a way that drug crimes are not.307 Downscale crime requires 
networks to receive, launder, and distribute stolen goods; upscale 
crime does not.308 Downscale crime thus requires a criminal 
community and a criminal market in order to work efficiently; upscale 
crime does not.309 Downscale crimes are relatively institutionalized, 
with different people holding a variety of normatively structured 
positions in the criminal enterprise; upscale crimes are much more 
atomistic.310 
Differences in types of crime may justify different enforcement 
practices. Where crime is socially structured (by social networks or 
markets), socially destructive, and conducted in the open, practices 
that involve prominent invasions into everyday behavior may be 
appropriate.311 Where crime is atomistic (i.e., unstructured), less 
harmful to the fabric of society, and conducted behind closed doors in 
the criminal’s office or home, more discreet practices are required. 
Like the crimes they address, these different enforcement practices are 
community-specific, and location driven. Different communities, with 
different economic, social, and criminal profiles, will thus experience 
policing differently. 
Drug crime erases distinctions between the types of crime 
committed in upscale and downscale communities, though in multiple, 
complex ways. Whilst traditional police enforcement “allocat[es] . . . 
police resources . . . driven by the incidence and location of the 
relevant crimes,”312 drug crimes do not depend upon location in this 
 
 306. See Stenning, supra note 304, at 336–45 (providing an analysis of the different models of 
accountability applicable to private security versus public police that are not applicable in the same 
ways to public police). 
 307. Stuntz, supra note 298, at 1802–03. 
 308. Id. at 1802. 
 309. Id. 
 310. Id. 
 311. See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 298, at 1813–15. 
 312. Stuntz, supra note 301, at 1875 (“When police seek to catch murderers or burglars, they 
go to where the murders and burglaries happen.”). 
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manner. Drug markets, for example, cross the line dividing rich and 
poor.313 Because of the number of crimes outstrips resources, the 
police cannot investigate them all and are free to choose which 
locations to target and what tactics to use.314 The locations and tactics 
they select will, however, be driven by the ability of individuals to 
contest and complain about policing practices effectively,315 which in 
turn is a feature of their social capital and serves to differentiate 
upscale and downscale policing. 
These different styles of policing may be deployed unevenly 
across society, so that discrete tactics are pursued from place to place 
to control distinct classes of persons. Some of these differential 
enforcement practices may be justified given structural differences 
between rich and poor distribution and consumption networks in the 
different communities.316 In downscale communities, where drug 
distribution and consumption is open, William Stuntz has argued that 
more frequent targeting of drug crime and the use of a variety of more 
or less invasive searches and seizures of persons and property may 
make good sense from the perspective of both detection and 
prevention.317 Such practices make less sense in upscale markets 
where many of the illegal transactions occur in private.318 All the 
same, differences in otherwise justified enforcement practice 
contribute to class and race based differences in policing.319 
The different tactics used against different forms of drug crime 
are often matched by differences in the type of police officer using 
those tactics. The institutional approach to policing recognizes that the 
police are not a monolith but are constituted by different officers 
serving different functions. Policing is a complex, plural, and 
fragmented business. The police reflect that complexity. Some are 
 
 313. Stuntz, supra note 298, at 1803. 
 314. Id. at 1819 (“[T]he police . . . must decide where to look, in a world where the crimes are 
happening everywhere. It follows that . . . when they enforce the drug laws, whom they catch 
depends on where they look.”). 
 315. See Stuntz, supra note 298, at 1800 (discussing ways in which police externalize costs of 
policing). 
 316. See Stuntz, supra note 298, at 1824; Stuntz, supra note 301, at 1876–77. 
 317. See Stuntz, supra note 298, at 1820. 
 318. Id. at 1821; Stuntz, supra note 301, at 1898 n.64. 
 319. Stuntz, supra note 301, at 1877–78 (claiming that differential enforcement of prohibition 
laws “affected the normative punch the law packed”); see id. at 1878–79 (“[D]ifferential 
enforcement breed[s] contempt for the law, which in turn bre[e]d[s] defeat for the norm the law 
embodied.”). 
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uniformed, some are plain clothed.320 Some specialize in the 
investigation of narcotics crimes; others are generalist crime-fighters 
and first-responders, ready to cope with whatever comes their way.321 
Some work undercover; others patrol the streets by foot or in a car, 
responding to calls for help or aggressively stopping and frisking 
passersby.322 Where the police use public, visible deployments of 
uniformed officers and force in downscale neighborhoods, they may 
use undercover, low-visibility, or invisible deployments of 
plainclothed officers in upscale neighborhoods. Once again, public 
perceptions of criminality and experiences of policing will be very 
different indeed. 
Drug transportation, which happens on the nation’s shared 
highways and transportation routes, also confounds place-driven 
distinctions between upscale and downscale crime. The police may 
combat both drug markets and drug transportation using preventative 
rather than only reactive policing techniques, further increasing police 
discretion to choose where and when to engage in policing.323 
Accordingly, when determining how to tackle drug crimes, the nature 
of the crime as much as anything else vests the police with a 
tremendous degree of “enforcement discretion”324 over whom to 
target, stop, and arrest. 
Taking an institutional approach to the police and policing reveals 
some important insights about the state’s relationship with its subjects. 
William Stuntz, for example, was highly attentive to some of the cost-
benefit incentives of policing. He argued that differences in policing 
styles may respond to differences between different, upscale and 
downscale, places.325 Others have suggested that the types of crimes 
committed in those places may be incomparable or 
incommensurable,326 and so the police rationally may—and perhaps 
 
 320. DAVID H. BAYLEY, POLICE FOR THE FUTURE 57 (1994). 
 321. Id. at 58. 
 322. See, e.g., BRODEUR, supra note 256, at 139–40; see also BAYLEY, supra note 320, at 17–
43 (discussing the vast number of institutions, including the public police, that perform policing 
tasks, as the “police assemblage”). 
 323. See Stuntz, supra note 298, at 1820. 
 324. Stuntz, supra note 301, at 1875. 
 325. Stuntz, supra note 298, at 1802–03. 
 326. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Punishment Incommensurability, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 691, 
694–701 (1998) (discussing social meaning of different crimes and criminal sanctions in terms of 
incommensurability); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 
591, 620–21 (1996) (discussing qualitative expressive differences between crimes). 
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even should—take different approaches to policing those crimes. 
Stuntz recognized, however, that drug crime does not fit this mold. 
When policing drug crime, especially on the highways, the police are 
policing the same space, but treating people differently. The 
institutional approach may have something to say about both how 
policing is different for different people in different places. And the 
institutional approach may also say whether these differences are 
tolerable, given the nature and function of the public police. 
Whatever crime-fighting reasons there may be for discrete 
policing tactics disappear, however, on the highway. Whatever class- 
or place-based obstacles to certain policing techniques might justify 
differential policing of upscale and downscale neighborhoods, these 
evaporate once rich and poor alike take to the road. Drug enforcement 
on the nation’s highways ought to produce equal treatment across 
communities.327 Instead, targeting the nation’s highways produces 
hyperinvestigation of minority motorists through illegitimate, biased, 
discriminatory policies and practices that undermine the status of the 
police as a public institution. 
Choosing to target criminals’ shipment of drugs on the highways 
through a program of drug interdiction does not, however, liberate the 
police from the sort of public accountability placed upon them by the 
public. Indeed, nowhere is the distinction between “our police” and 
“those criminals” more profound than on the roads and freeways. On 
the one hand, the police are highly effective at traffic policing—one 
of “those areas of social life where criminal activity is rife.”328 On the 
other hand, “traffic policing is regarded by police and public alike as 
a marginal police responsibility, almost a distraction from ‘real police 
work,’”329 where real police work is supposed to be the policing the 
sort of street crime which the residents of upscale communities rarely 
experience but of which they are disproportionately afraid. Upscale 
individuals may expect a “break” from the police for a violation of the 
traffic laws, especially if that violation is minor or the first time the 
 
 327. See Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A Comment, 
107 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1277–78 (1994) (suggesting similarly that leveling up or down is a (non-
compulsory) option). 
 328. WADDINGTON, supra note 278, at 10. 
 329. Id. 
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person has been caught. And the officer may even face institutional 
pressure to go along with these perceptions.330 
Instead, the public police are revealed to be captured, politically, 
by the expectations of the upscale public and the social capital they 
are able to leverage to ensure that the police are, and remain, their 
partisans. The police, for upscale individuals, are “our” police.331 The 
same socio-economic factors that separate these communities into 
upscale and downscale and operate to segregate them by race 
contribute to the perception of who is an insider, who an outsider. 
Having witnessed the effects of the disparate criminalization of 
minority communities, the mostly white upscale community 
possessing the social capital to end disparate criminalization and 
partisan policing regularly choose not to do anything about it. 
Worse, upscale communities notice none of the ill effects of 
discriminatory enforcement plaguing minority individuals and 
communities.332 In fact, their irrational fear of crime is stoked by their 
upscale descriptive and evaluative social norms which are not shared 
by, and which may be antagonistic to, the racial minorities that feel 
the impact of policing policy and practice.333 Upscale fear of 
downscale crime—and upscale perceptions of the racialized nature of 
that crime bolstered by the political rhetoric surrounding drug 
crime334—puts pressure on executive branch law enforcement 
officials to negate in partisan, discriminatory enforcement practices. 
Political power often rests in the hands of a minority of dedicated, 
cohesive groups within the upscale community—groups that identify 
 
 330. See, e.g., JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN 
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (4th ed. 2011) (discussing institutional pressures not to write traffic tickets 
to preserve legitimacy). 
 331. See, e.g., GIRLING ET AL., supra note 286, at 133 (discussing notion of “our” police); 
LOADER & WALKER, supra note 287, at 73 (describing police partisanship as “a means of fortifying 
either the interests of the state itself, or those of constituencies favored by the present configuration 
of economic and social relations”). 
 332. Except perhaps disparate ones, such as slightly higher taxes or money distributed away 
from public schools. 
 333. See, e.g., GIRLING ET AL., supra note 286, at 172 (“The demand for order is rarely all-of-
a-piece. Rather, a diversity of legitimate orders are embedded in people’s crime-talk, each of which 
connects in different ways with considerations of place, the respective obligations of state and 
citizen, the appropriateness and anticipated efficacy of local and national interventions, and the 
question of how best to understand and deal with those deemed in breach of the expected 
requirements of lawfulness, respect and civility.”). 
 334. See, e.g., Paul Butler, Retribution, for Liberals, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1873, 1876–77 (1999) 
(racial majority does not care about criminal law when punishment directed at African American 
“others”). 
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select issues as of particular importance to them and organize around 
such issues to ensure the law reflects their concerns.335 At the state and 
federal level, those minority groups that bear the brunt of policing’s 
impact are excluded from making police policy. As a result, policing 
policy and practice becomes partisan all the way down, from the 
legislators and courts, to the police on the streets. 
C.  Harassment 
Hyperinvestigation differs from other forms of policing not only 
in its targets and tactics, but in its goals and techniques. Instead of only 
aiming at criminal prosecution, the low-level social control exerted by 
the police on public streets and highways also serves to establish their 
control of these spaces.336 Much of low-level policing thus depends 
upon police patrols, not primarily to detect crime, but rather to 
demonstrate that the state is operative and authoritative in some 
community. Certainly, the police may use their public authority to 
search for drugs or to respond to flagrant acts of public criminality, 
such as traveling well over the speed limit.337 Nonetheless, a core 
function of hyperinvestigation is to proclaim police authority over 
selected segments of the population by requiring the public to comply 
with their directives. Much of low-level policing might be defined as 
the deployment of police-characteristic techniques of social control 
directed towards asserting their distinctive authority on the streets and 
highways of various states and municipalities around the country.338 
Hyperinvestigation is not an accident. It responds to a deliberate 
institutional policy to target certain individuals for criminal justice 
intervention. The goal of the policy is to ensure that the distribution of 
policing is not equally shared across the population. By selecting the 
already vulnerable, precarious members of society as targets for police 
intervention, the police ensure that their strategies are less likely to 
 
 335. See LISA L. MILLER, THE PERILS OF FEDERALISM : RACE, POVERTY, AND THE POLITICS 
OF CRIME CONTROL (2008) (discussing interest groups and crime politics in states); Andrew E. 
Taslitz, Fourth Amendment Federalism and the Silencing of the American Poor , 85 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 277 (2010) (discussing how Virginia v. Moore, 128 S. Ct. 1598 (2008), demonstrates how 
Fourth Amendment rules vary locally which has implications based on race and class); Stuntz, 
supra note 301, at 1872 (discussing how social norms and criminal law drive each other). 
 336. See, e.g., KLEINIG, supra note 251, at 51–70 (discussing the evolving roles of the police). 
 337. See, e.g., EPP ET AL., supra note 27 (discussing how police decide to stop a driver and the 
racial implications). 
 338. Rather than crime-fighting directed towards punishing individuals through the court 
system. 
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face organized or powerful challenges.339 Instead, the process of 
policing re-inscribes the already marginal within a social system that 
undermines their ability to avoid and resist state intervention in 
general, and the police in particular. 
Hyperinvestigation becomes institutionalized in two distinctive 
ways. On the one hand, the investigatory stop characteristic of 
hyperinvestigation has been deliberately created by law-enforcement 
professionals and refined over time by practitioners and researchers in 
the criminal justice field.340 Law enforcement has formalized the 
patrol police strategy of stopping marginalized members of the 
community for drug interdiction through policy, training, and 
institutional incentives.341 As a consequence, “the investigatory stop 
ha[s] become scripted, predictable, and deeply institutionalized.”342 
In addition, however, the practice of hyperinvestigative 
investigatory stops draws upon informal norms of policing 
practices.343 These rules or policies are often not articulated: instead, 
they are subcultural “recipe rules”: “rules of thumb” distinct from 
published administrative rules that determine whom to stop, how to 
record the incident, whether and how to charge, etc.344 When operating 
according to these implicit rules of engagement, “reasonable suspicion 
of criminal activity, in a legal sense, is not the basis for an 
investigatory stop. Officers are to pursue stops and searches on the 
basis of little more than unsatisfied curiosity.”345 
 
 339. One way of conceiving of these vulnerable individuals is as a precariat. See Guy Standing, 
The Precariat: From Denizens to Citizens?, 44 POLITY 588 (2012). Whilst the term does not pick 
out every feature of the sorts of individuals the police might prey upon, some are suggestive: they 
do not participate in a cohesive form of social organization and lack the ability to participate 
effectively in the political life of their communities. Id. at 590–91. 
 340. EPP ET AL., supra note 27, at 7 (“The investigatory stop is the deliberate creation of police 
leaders, led by police professional associations, policing researchers, and police chiefs”). 
 341. Id. (“Instead, attention should focus on institutionalized practice: how the structure of 
incentives, training, and policy in contemporary policing makes it more likely that officers will act 
on the basis of bigotry or implicit stereotypes, leading to racial disparities in outcomes. It is our 
thesis that a specific, well-entrenched, institutionalized practice of the investigatory stop is the main 
source of racial disparities in police stops”); see id. at 38 (“First, investigatory stops are an 
institutionalized practice: while undoubtedly some individual officers may learn the technique on 
their own, it is taught and propagated by formal police training and shared educational materials.”). 
 342. Id. at 36. 
 343. Id. at 7 (“It is implemented through professional training and the fostering of shared 
professional norms and culture.”). 
 344. See RICHARD V. ERICSON, REPRODUCING ORDER: A STUDY OF POLICE PATROL WORK 
25–26 (1982). 
 345. EPP ET AL., supra note 27, at 37. 
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That curiosity, however, takes on a distinctive racial caste given 
the nature of precariousness in American society. Worse, that curiosity 
tends to operate as an important form of social control, serving to 
“convey powerful messages about citizenship and equality.”346 Once 
investigatory stops are regarded as a form of social control, the point 
of which is to discipline vulnerable members of the public and to 
convey messages of exclusion and power, then the low hit rates 
associated with racial profiling are not a bug but a feature of this 
program of law enforcement. The goal is not to catch the guilty, but 
rather the traditional American police policy of harassing the 
vulnerable.347 As Charles Epp and his co-authors describe it: “Police 
stops matter. No form of direct government control comes close to 
these stops in sheer numbers, frequency, proportion of the population 
affected, and, in many instances, the degree of coercive intrusion.”348 
The characteristic way in which the police induce the public’s 
compliance with their directives is through the use of force. It is not 
the only possible way to encourage individuals to comply.349 
Nonetheless, it is the paradigmatic social-control tool that the police 
use to ensure compliance.350 Indeed, the ubiquity of force as a measure 
of police authority prompted Egon Bittner’s famous conceptualization 
of “the police a[s] nothing else than a mechanism for the distribution 
of situationally justified force in society.”351 
On this view, police contact with the targeted groups is the whole 
point of the system; the goal is to establish order by putting members 
of those groups in their place in terms of both territory and status. In a 
culturally and politically plural society, maintaining order usually 
means imposing a particular vision of social order and authority. Low-
level hyperinvestigation is not simply a means of maintaining order, 
 
 346. Id. at 2. 
 347. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1968) (critiquing the law-enforcement strategy 
of “wholesale harassment by certain elements of the police community, of which minority groups, 
particularly Negroes, frequently complain”). 
 348. EPP ET AL., supra note 27, at 2. 
 349. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 
CRIME & JUST. 283 (2003) (discussing a process-based approach as an alternative to the use of 
force); see also Eric J. Miller, Role-Based Policing: Restraining Police Conduct “Outside the 
Legitimate Investigative Sphere”, 94 CAL. L. REV. 617 (2006) (discussing role-based preventative 
policing). 
 350. JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE EXCESSIVE 
USE OF FORCE 37 (1993) (“[A]nybody who fails to understand the centrality of force to police work 
has no business in a police uniform.”). 
 351. BITTNER, supra note 296, at 39. 
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but of imposing it. Hyperinvestigation, as a form of social control, 
relies upon police decisions as to who belongs where, and what 
conduct is socially permissible in those localized spaces. These 
decisions are made against a background of judgments about the status 
of the social neighborhood, how orderly or disorderly ought the 
neighborhood to be, and what sorts of people or activities are 
consistent with the type of communities policed. 
The problem of low-level social control by the police is often thus 
the problem of order- or authority-establishing contacts with the 
public developing into physical harassment.352 Harassment as a 
technique of order-maintenance can be applied indiscriminately, but 
is often directed at discrete individuals and groups: the poor, racial 
minorities, and other out-groups that the police select as challenging 
their notions of order. The police do not usually select those groups on 
their own. Instead, they reinforce the dominant values of society—
which include upscale values that tolerate, or even prize, 
discrimination against downscale or minority groups regarded as 
dangerous or criminal.353 
The determination that some person or activity requires the police 
to intervene is subject to the problems of explicit or implicit bias. 
Conscious or unconscious assessments of minority conduct will 
determine who the police consider disorderly and how to respond.354 
Explicit or implicit bias may cause the police to engage in low-level 
social control and harassment more frequently and more forcibly when 
they are dealing with African Americans and other minorities.355 
V.  AUTHORITARIAN SEARCHES 
There is an implicit but inescapable normative valence in the 
privacy-versus-property debate. The central question, everyone 
recognizes, is: what ought to be the state’s relationship, through the 
police, to the public? The Court’s response has generally been to avoid 
 
 352. See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 15 (“[C]ourts still retain their traditional responsibility to guard 
against police conduct which is over bearing or harassing, or which trenches upon personal security 
without the objective evidentiary justification which the Constitution requires.”). 
 353. See, e.g., WADDINGTON, supra note 278, at 40 (“[P]olice officers are rarely perplexed 
about which values should apply, because certain values prevail since they are the values of 
dominant groups in society.”). 
 354. John Van Maanen, The Asshole in POLICING: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 143, 144 
(George Alpert, et al. eds., 2d ed. 2015). 
 355. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 240, at 737; Carbado & Rock, supra note 240 at 167; 
Richardson, supra note 241.  
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tackling this difficult and politically fraught question directly. Instead, 
the Court has chosen to sublimate the normative, political question by 
burying it within, on the one hand, legal doctrine or, on the other hand, 
empirical conjectures about social norms. 
Historically, the turn to pop-empirical speculation replaced a 
failed doctrinal approach grounded in the law of trespass.356 In other 
words, a privacy analysis was supposed to make up for the deficiencies 
of the prior property analysis of Fourth Amendment rights.357 The 
empirical approach tended to assess how intrusive a particular method 
of surveillance was by determining how much effort it took the state 
to uncover private information. However, police use of “big data”358 
has forced the Court to reconsider this approach: the Court can no 
longer rely upon the cost or limited availability of some technology to 
determine its intrusiveness. Big data has made even highly intrusive 
searches an easy, everyday occurrence.359 
Now that the Court’s empirical cover has dissipated, the Court’s 
property-dominant analysis has attempted to fill the gap. This latest 
property analysis was supposed to make up for problems with 
privacy’s empirical analysis (which in turn replaced the failings of an 
earlier property analysis). However, as I have suggested, property 
analysis fails to provide the sort of neutral principles that have eluded 
the empirical approach to privacy. We now seem to be in a doctrinal 
death-spiral in which no one knows how to address the normative core 
of the Fourth Amendment, at least without projecting their own 
predilections onto their interpretation. 
Chief Justice Roberts has, in the big data context, advanced a 
competing interpretation. He has articulated, in skeletal form at any 
rate, a jurisprudence of anti-arbitrariness to protect against mass data 
policing. That jurisprudence neither embraces the neo-property 
approach articulated by Justices Kennedy, Alito, Thomas, or 
 
 356. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (rejecting Hester, Olmstead, and the other 
trespass cases); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 357. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171, n.7 (1974) (“Common authority is, of course, 
not to be implied from the mere property interest a third party has in the property. The authority 
which justifies the third-party consent does not rest upon the law of property, with its attendant 
historical and legal refinements, . . . but rests rather on mutual use of the property by persons 
generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that 
any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others 
have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched.” ). 
 358. See FERGUSON, supra note 25, at 98. 
 359. Id. 
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Gorsuch—nor does it endorse the return to, or retention of, the 
empirical privacy analysis advocated by Justice Kagan.360 
The Chief Justice recognizes that mass data searches which 
comprehensively expose the details of individuals’ personal 
information upsets the relationship between state and civilian.361 
Where privacy and property fail to provide sufficient 
interpretative purchase to articulate Fourth Amendment protections, 
Chief Justice Roberts has turned to security, or at any rate its political 
cognate: an anti-arbitrariness that operates by “plac[ing] obstacles in 
the way of a too permeating police surveillance.”362 The Chief Justice 
has tended to find a willing partner in this interpretative enterprise in 
Justice Sotomayor, who has extended this anti-arbitrariness 
jurisprudence to certain aspects of street policing.363 
The goal in this Part is speculative and suggestive. I shall suggest 
some ways in which more flesh can be put on the Chief Justice’s anti-
arbitrariness skeleton. The core claim will be that we can identify 
certain policing practices that, like mass data policing, render persons 
insecure or vulnerable to thoroughgoing surveillance and interference. 
Some of these mass policing practices are not high-tech, however: 
they are distinctively low tech. But they present the same problems as 
mass data policing: for a relatively low effort, the police can engage 
in far-reaching searches and seizures that render people vulnerable in 
the central aspects of their persons364 that the Court should strike a 
new balance between the interests of the state and the interests of its 
subject. 
Chief Justice Roberts certainly considers a person’s security to be 
a central aspect of his constitutional reordering. His vision of our 
dependence on electronic devices projects contemporary persons as 
virtually cyborgs, in which cell phones are “such a pervasive and 
insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might 
 
 360. See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 13 (2013) (Kagan, J., concurring). 
 361. Compare the Court’s approach in Carpenter and Riley with its approach in Maryland v. 
King, 569 U.S. 435 (2013) (permitting collection of “junk” DNA, which gives only limited 
information about an individual’s identity, as part of the routing booking procedure of arrested 
civilians). 
 362. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018) (quoting United States v. Di Re, 
332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)). 
 363. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2064 (2016); Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 542 
(2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 364. Kaaryn Gustafson has alerted me to the importance of persons as a suppressed Fourth 
Amendment concept. 
(6) 52.2_MILLER (DO NOT DELETE) 12/3/2019  1:37 PM 
166 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:107 
conclude they were an important feature of human anatomy.”365 They 
operate as ankle monitors broadcasting our location wherever we 
might be.366 This intimate, personal, quasi-physical approach to 
technology breaks down the distinction between physical objects and 
data, and suggests the focus is really on the manner in which 
technology transforms our personhood to render us vulnerable to 
police rummaging through our lives.367 
The state’s ability to rummage, however, need not be limited by 
technology: after all, Chief Justice Roberts’s invocation of the general 
warrant references the revolutionary era and its avowedly low-tech 
forms of customs interdiction. Drug interdiction, and, in particular, 
police policies advocating widespread investigatory stops, 
contemplate a similar, broad-based investigatory activity to the sort of 
customs and house searches attacked by James Otis. This type of 
activity shares the vices of low visibility, altered state-subject 
relations, and comprehensive effects on the lives of persons that 
animate the anti-arbitrariness approach from the revolutionary era to 
the Court’s opinions in Riley v. California368 and Carpenter.369 
A.  Chief Justice Roberts and the Jurisprudence of 
Personal Security370 
Chief Justice Roberts’s account of the harms of big data policing 
focuses on changes in nature of personhood. Our dependence upon 
new technology—our transformation into a type of cyborg—makes us 
weaker, not stronger. Through our smartphones and their tremendous 
capacity to record and retain the most intimate details of our personal 
life on a massive scale, we have become more vulnerable to the state 
and its intrusions into all aspects of our most intimate details. In this 
transformed relationship between state and civilian, the state should 
be resisted, and individual insecurity ameliorated, by placing 
“obstacles”371 in the path of the state to equalize the balance between 
 
 365. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014) (emphasis added). 
 366. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218 (“[W]hen the Government tracks the location of a cell phone 
it achieves near perfect surveillance, as if it had attached an ankle monitor to the phone’s user.”). 
 367. See, e.g., id. at 2213 (discussing the use of general warrants). 
 368.  573 U.S. 373 (2014). 
 369. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494 (discussing revolutionary era prohibitions on rummaging using 
general warrants). 
 370. My thanks to Kaaryn Gustafson for pushing me to think of this aspect of the Fourth 
Amendment in terms of its protections of “persons,” not simply “security.” 
 371. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214. 
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police and public. In this relational—if somewhat sketchy—account 
of the nature of police and policing, the individual is made more robust 
in part by weakening the state. 
Some features of the Chief Justice’s big data jurisprudence are 
worth emphasizing here. The first is that he emphasizes the precarious 
or vulnerable position in which big data places civilians. Big data, he 
suggests, transforms the nature of personhood. We are no longer 
whole persons, he suggests, without our mobile phones. They are, he 
insists, “a pervasive and insistent part of daily life.”372 His description 
suggests that we cannot properly exist without them: that mobile 
phones (and the benefits of access to data that goes along with them) 
force themselves upon us, rendering us dependent, vulnerable. 
Indeed, his discussion asserts that mobile technology is a form of 
prosthetic device, or even more than that, “an important feature of 
human anatomy.”373 Our reliance upon these devices has reshaped 
who we are as persons. We are no longer whole without them. These 
devices take us beyond the limits of our physical realities, so searches 
of individuals with mobile phones are no longer “limited by physical 
realities [nor] tend[ ] as a general matter to constitute only a narrow 
intrusion on privacy.”374 Given this quantitative and qualitative 
difference from traditional, episodic, individualized searches incident 
to arrest, limited to the “search a personal item or two in the occasional 
case,”375 the Chief Justice, writing for the majority in Riley v. 
California, rejected the “routine,” warrantless searches of such 
information.376 
Moreover, in both Riley v. California and Carpenter, Chief 
Justice Roberts hearkened back to the revolutionary era, and a 
particular understanding of its political philosophy. He emphasized 
the Founders’ dominant anti-tyrannical and civic republican 
philosophy, which focuses on freedom from government 
domination.377 His anti-tyranny emphasis, maintained from Riley to 
Carpenter contrasts starkly with the liberal or libertarian reading of 
 
 372. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484. 
 373. Id. 
 374. Id. at 2489. 
 375. Id. at 2490. 
 376. Id. at 2485. 
 377. See, e.g., MARY NYQUIST, ARBITRARY RULE: SLAVERY, TYRANNY, AND THE POWER OF 
LIFE AND DEATH 132 (2013); PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND 
GOVERNMENT 275–76 (1997). 
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the revolutionary era writings promoted by Justice Thomas in his 
encomium to John Locke’s property theory in his Carpenter dissent.378 
In both of his big data opinions, Chief Justice Roberts points to 
the famous speech by James Otis that inspired John Adams, and with 
him, the American revolt against British rule. In Riley v. California, 
the Chief Justice notes that: 
Our cases have recognized that the Fourth Amendment was 
the founding generation’s response to the reviled “general 
warrants” and “writs of assistance” of the colonial era, which 
allowed British officers to rummage through homes in an 
unrestrained search for evidence of criminal activity. 
Opposition to such searches was in fact one of the driving 
forces behind the Revolution itself. In 1761, the patriot James 
Otis delivered a speech in Boston denouncing the use of writs 
of assistance. A young John Adams was there, and he would 
later write that “[e]very man of a crowded audience appeared 
to me to go away, as I did, ready to take arms against writs 
of assistance.” According to Adams, Otis’s speech was “the 
first scene of the first act of opposition to the arbitrary claims 
of Great Britain. Then and there the child Independence was 
born.”379 
And describing the protections and purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment in Carpenter, he again emphasizes that: 
The Founding generation crafted the Fourth Amendment as 
a “response to the reviled ‘general warrants’ and ‘writs of 
assistance’ of the colonial era, which allowed British officers 
to rummage through homes in an unrestrained search for 
evidence of criminal activity.” In fact, as John Adams 
recalled, the patriot James Otis’s 1761 speech condemning 
writs of assistance was “the first act of opposition to the 
arbitrary claims of Great Britain” and helped spark the 
Revolution itself.380 
 
 378. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206,  2239 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2634 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting)) (“The 
political philosophy of John Locke, moreover, ‘permeated the 18th-century political scene in 
America.’”). 
 379. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494 (citations omitted). 
 380. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213 (citations omitted). 
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The arbitrariness worry is a specific one. It invokes a particular model 
of freedom from government interference.381 That model emphasizes 
personal security from arbitrary government invasions of personal 
security,382 understood as unchecked interference with the interests of 
others, often called non-domination.383 Non-arbitrariness or non-
domination generally involves regulating government conduct 
through public, prospective norms (the rule of law, not the whims of 
men)384 and the diffusion of power across the different branches of 
government.385 The rule of law, however, must be enforced to prevent 
arbitrariness; otherwise legal protection remains arbitrary, existing at 
the whim of the police officer.386 
 
 381. Anti-arbitrariness is specifically associated with the political tradition of civic 
republicanism. See, e.g., FRANK LOVETT, A GENERAL THEORY OF DOMINATION AND JUSTICE 96–
97 (2010). The Fourth Amendment’s author, James Madison, certainly regarded himself as an 
“inheritor[ ]” of this civic republican tradition. See ISEULT HONOHAN, CIVIC REPUBLICANISM 103 
(2002). 
 382. For example, contemporary civic republican Frank Lovett defines “social power as 
arbitrary to the extent that its potential exercise is not externally constrained by effective rules, 
procedures, or goals that are common knowledge to all persons or groups concerned.” LOVETT, 
supra note 381, at 96 (emphasis omitted). By contrast, Philip Pettit, perhaps the preeminent 
contemporary civic republican, defines power as arbitrary when it fails to track the interests of the 
individuals affected. PETTIT, supra note 377. Madison operated firmly in this republican tradition, 
which was “understood mainly as the security of individuals from arbitrary interference through 
constitutional and legal means.” HONOHAN, supra note 381, at 103. 
 383. HENRY S. RICHARDSON, DEMOCRATIC AUTONOMY: PUBLIC REASONING ABOUT THE 
ENDS OF POLICY 28–36 (2003); PETTIT, supra note 377, at 51–78. 
 384. See Quentin Skinner, Machiavelli on Virtù and the Maintenance of Liberty, 2 VISIONS OF 
POL. 160, 173–76 (2002) (discussing Machiavelli’s claim that people achieve freedom only if 
chained by law); PETTIT, supra note 377, at 172–76. 
 385. See, e.g., JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PHILIP PETTIT, NOT JUST DESERTS: A REPUBLICAN 
THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1990); PETTIT, supra note 377; RICHARDSON, supra note 383; 
Skinner, supra note 384. 
 386. I have claimed that this is the view of the Warren Court in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 
660 (1961) (“[W]e can no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any police officer who, 
in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded on 
reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees him, 
to the police officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, 
that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice.”). The Mapp Court calls 
police activity that is arbitrary in this way “official lawlessness.” Id. at 655. Justice Sotomayor 
echoes this language in her Strieff dissent. See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2065–66 (2016) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Th[e] ‘exclusionary rule’ removes an incentive for officers to search 
us without proper justification. It also keeps courts from being ‘made party to lawless invasions of 
the constitutional rights of citizens by permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such 
invasions.’ When courts admit only lawfully obtained evidence, they encourage ‘those who 
formulate law enforcement polices, and the officers who implement them, to incorporate Fourth 
Amendment ideals into their value system.’ But when courts admit illegally obtained evidence as 
well, they reward “manifest neglect if not an open defiance of  the prohibitions of 
the Constitution.”). 
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B.  Justice Sotomayor: Race-Based Vulnerability 
Given Chief Justice Roberts’s turn to an anti-arbitrariness 
jurisprudence in the context of the vulnerability he identifies with 
dependence on big data technology, it is unsurprising that he has 
embraced the warrant requirement more fully than many of his 
predecessors.387 His electronic vulnerability jurisprudence, however, 
with its emphasis on arbitrary intrusions upon personal security, 
extends beyond the realm of high-tech, mass data policing to implicate 
police practice in the domain of low-tech mass policing, at least of the 
hyperinvestigatory sort. 
Race, I have suggested, renders individuals vulnerable to 
institutional police pressures to target and harass minority members of 
the public as a form of low-level social control. Upscale individuals 
and communities, with a monopoly on social capital and political 
power, pressure the police to exclude and discipline members of 
minority groups so that they know their place. When traveling the 
nation’s highways, or traversing some city’s sidewalks, race operates 
as a form of vagrancy: 
police used these laws to demarcate who was out of place in 
a given community—who was denied full respect for their 
mobility, their autonomy, their lifestyle, or their beliefs. 
Marginal people shared a vulnerability to regulation by 
vagrancy law. That is, they shared a vulnerability to arrest at 
almost any time and place for any behavior or for no behavior 
at all.388 
Vulnerability, in this sense, is a security issue, and therefore an anti-
arbitrariness one. 
Justice Sotomayor, for one, has recognized that vulnerability to 
arbitrary police interdiction pervades policing of minority 
communities. Her impassioned dissent in Utah v. Strieff recites the 
ways in which minority candidates are vulnerable to arbitrary 
interference by the police.389 She emphasizes the arbitrary nature of 
 
 387. See, e.g., Benjamin J. Priester, A Warrant Requirement Resurgence? The Fourth 
Amendment in the Roberts Court, 93 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 89 (2019) (discussing Roberts Court’s 
embrace of the warrant requirement). 
 388. Risa L. Goluboff, Dispatch from the Supreme Court Archives: Vagrancy, Abortion, and 
What the Links Between Them Reveal About the History of Fundamental Rights, 62 STAN. L. REV. 
1361, 1371 (2010). 
 389. Id. at 2070–71. 
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such interference: the search is “lawless,”390 but no longer subject to 
interbranch judicial control through the exclusion of evidence. 
By legitimizing the conduct that produces this double 
consciousness, this case tells everyone, white and black, 
guilty and innocent, that an officer can verify your legal 
status at any time. It says that your body is subject to invasion 
while courts excuse the violation of your rights. It implies 
that you are not a citizen of a democracy but the subject of a 
carceral state, just waiting to be cataloged.391 
The solution would be to extend Chief Justice Roberts’s 
solicitude for vulnerable personhood on the basis of data to persons 
vulnerable on the basis of race. Whilst the Chief Justice’s anti-
arbitrariness jurisprudence is not fully developed, his willingness to 
denominate certain searches arbitrary—and certain types of 
personhood vulnerable—has a major legal pay-off. It precludes the 
police from searching without a warrant and provides a major form of 
redress—exclusion—for violations of that warrant requirement. 
An institutional approach to the police and policing reveals the 
ways in which minority members of our community are just as 
vulnerable as people with smartphones to police interference. Police 
policy, often ratified by local or state politics, justifies targeting 
minority individuals for differential search practices. These practices 
operate as a means both of searching for evidence of drug crime and 
as a form of low-level social control symbolizing subordinate status 
through vulnerability to searches and seizures. That symbolic message 
is, as Justice Sotomayor notes, no accident. 
[I]t is no secret that people of color are disproportionate 
victims of this type of scrutiny . . . . 
. . . . 
We must not pretend that the countless people who are 
routinely targeted by police are “isolated.” They are the 
canaries in the coal mine whose deaths, civil and literal, warn 
us that no one can breathe in this atmosphere.392 
 
 390. Id. at 2065. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Byrd case appears to present a straightforward question: does 
the driver of a rental car who is not listed on the rental agreement have 
a Fourth Amendment right to object to the search of the car? The 
Court’s approach to answering that question, by turning to the 
property concept of bailment, obscures a major feature of the case: that 
the stop was suspicionless and race based. Such stops are not an 
isolated feature of highway patrol, but a core feature of drug 
interdiction. I have called it hyperinvestigation. It works, in part, 
because of the disenfranchisement of African Americans as a political 
minority; and it works, in part, to reinforce that disenfranchisement as 
a form of social control. 
I have further suggested that the Court has the tools to address 
this problem ready at hand. The Court could use its nascent 
jurisprudence of personhood, security, and anti-arbitrariness, 
developed in the domain of big data and mobile phone technology, 
and apply it to mass search programs that depend upon the 
vulnerability of the people searched. Whilst Chief Justice Roberts has 
provided important suggestions about that sort of jurisprudence in the 
context of big data, Justice Sotomayor has provided additional clues 
about its application in the context of institutional policies that provide 
for suspicionless searches. 
 
